



Ākimcañña: Self-Naughting¹

Vivo autem, jam non ego

Gal. 2:20

Eyā diz solte du sēle scheiden von allem dem, daz iht ist.
Eckhart, Pfeiffer ed., p. 525

*Her umbe sol der mensche geflizzen sin, daz er sich entbilde
sin selbes unt allen créature noch keinen vater wizze denne
got alleine. . . . Dis ist allen menschen fremde . . . ich wolde,
das irz befunden hētet mit lebenne.*

Eckhart, Pfeiffer ed., pp. 421, 464

When thou standest still from the thinking of self, and the
willing of self

Jacob Boehme, *Dialogues on the Supersensual Life*

An egomania occasioned the fall of Lucifer, who would be “like the most High” (Isa. 14:14), thinking, “Who is like me in Heaven or Earth?” (*Tabārī* xxiv), and desiring to deify himself (Augustine, *Quaestiones veteris et novi testamenti* cxiii), not in the way discussed below by an abnegation of selfhood, but, as St. Thomas Aquinas says, “by the virtue of his own nature” and “of his own power” (*Sum. Theol.* 1.63.3c). We are all to a greater or less extent egomaniacs, and to the same extent followers of Satan. Acts 5:36 refers to a certain Theudas as “boasting himself to be somebody.”

In the vernacular, when a man is presumptuous, we ask him, “Who do you think you are?” and when we refer to someone’s insignificance, we call him a “nobody” or, in earlier English, a “nothing.” In this worldly sense it is a good thing to be “someone” and a misfortune to be “nobody,” and from this point of view we think well of “ambition” (*iti-bhavābhava taṇhā*). To be “someone” is to have a name and lineage (*nāma-gotta*) or, at least, to have a place or rank in the world, some distinction that makes us recognizable and conspicuous. Our modern civilization is essentially individualistic and self-assertive, even our educational systems being more

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¹ As the title implies, this study is mainly based on Christian and Buddhist sources.

and more designed to foster “self-expression” and “self-realization”; and if we are at all concerned about what happens after death, it is in terms of the survival of our treasured “personality”² with all its attachments and memories.

On the other hand, in the words of Eckhart, “Holy scripture cries aloud for freedom from self.” In this unanimous and universal teaching, which affirms an absolute liberty and autonomy, spatial and temporal, attainable as well here and now as anywhere else, this treasured “personality” of ours is at once a prison and a fallacy, from which only the Truth shall set you free:³ a prison, because all definition limits that which is defined, and a fallacy because in this ever-changing composite and corruptible psychophysical “personality” it is impossible to grasp a constant, and impossible therefore to recognize any authentic or “real” substance. Insofar as man is merely a “reasoning and mortal animal,” tradition is in agreement with the modern determinist in affirming that “this man,” So-and-so (*yo-yamāyasmā evaṃ nāmo evaṃ gotto*, S III.25) has neither free will⁴

² We write “personality” because we are using the word here in its vulgar sense and not in the stricter and technical sense in which the veritable “person” is distinguished from the phenomenal “individual,” e.g., in AĀ II.3.2 and Boethius, *Contra Eutychen* II.

³ The doctrine is one of escape and the pursuit of happiness. It will not be confused with what has been called escapism. Escapism is an essentially selfish activity, failure to “face the music” (as when one “drowns one’s sorrows in drink”), and the choice of easier paths; escapism is a symptom of disappointment and is cynical rather than mature. We need hardly say that to “wish one had never been born” is the antithesis of the perfect sorrow that may be occasioned by the sense of a continued existence: we are born in order to die, but this death is not one that can be attained by suicide or by suffering death at the hands of others; it is not of ourselves or others, but only of God that it can be said in the words of St. John of the Cross, “and, slaying, dost from death to life translate.”

At the same time, the true way of “escape” is more strenuous by far than the life that is escaped (hence the designation of the religious in India as a “Toiler,” *śramaṇa*), and it is the degree of a man’s maturity (in Skr. the extent to which he is *pakva*, “pukka,” and no longer *āma*, “raw”) that is the measure of the possibility of his escape and consequent beatitude.

“The minds of some are set on Union (*yoga*), the minds of others on comfort (*kṣema*)” (TS II.5.11.5; cf. KU II.1-4).

⁴ The denial of freedom in “this man,” the individual, is explicit in Sn 350, “It does not belong to the many-folk to do what they will (*na kāmakaṛo hi puthujjanānam*).” Cf. “Ye cannot do the things that ye would” (Gal. 5:17). This denial is made in a very striking manner in Vin I.13-14 and S III.66-67, where for the usual formula according to which the body and mentality are *anattā*, not I, nor mine, the proof is offered that this body, sensibility, etc., cannot be “mine,” cannot be “I,” for if these were myself, or mine, they would never be sick, since in this case one could say, “Let my body, sensibility, etc., be thus, or not-thus,” nothing being really

nor any element of immortality. How little validity attaches to this man's conviction of freedom will appear if we reflect that while we speak of "doing what we like," we never speak of "being when we like," and that to conceive of a spatial liberty that is not also a temporal liberty involves a contradiction. Tradition, however, departs from science by replying to the man who confesses himself to be only a reasoning and mortal animal that he has "forgotten who he is" (Boethius, *De consolazione philosophiae*, prose vi), requires of him to "Know thyself,"⁵ and warns him "If thou knowest not thyself, begone" (*si ignoras te, egredere*, Song of Solomon, 1:8). Tradition, in other words, affirms the validity of our consciousness of being but distinguishes it from the So-and-so that we think we are. The validity of our consciousness of being is not established in metaphysics (as it is in philosophy) by the fact of thought or knowledge; on the contrary, our veritable being is distinguished from the operations of discursive thought and empirical knowing, which are simply the causally determined workings of the "reasoning and mortal animal," which are to be regarded *yathābhūtam*, not as affects but only as effects in which we (in our veritable being) are not really, but only supposedly, involved.

ours except to the extent that we have it altogether in our power, nor anything variable any part of an identity such as the notion of a "very person" (*satpuruṣa*) intends. A further consideration is this, that if the becoming (*bhāva*) of the finite individual were not absolutely determined by "fate," "mediate causes," or "*karma*" (the terms are synonymous), the idea of an omniscient providence (*prajñā*, *paññā*, knowledge of things not derived from the things themselves) would be unintelligible. In this connection we may remark that we are not, of course, concerned to prove dialectically any doctrine whatever, but only to exhibit its consistency and therefore with its intelligibility. This consistency of the Philosophia Perennis is indeed good ground for "faith" (i.e., confidence, as distinguished from mere belief), but as this "philosophy" is neither a "system" nor a "philosophy," it cannot be argued for or against.

⁵ E.g., Avencebrol, *Fons vitae* 1.2, "quid est ergo, quod debet homo inquirere in hac vita? . . . hoc est ut sciat se ipsum." Cf. Jacob Boehme, *De signatura rerum* 1.1. The reader will not confuse the "science of self" (*ātmaavidyā*) here with that intended by the psychologist, whether ancient or modern; as remarked by Edmond Vansteenberghe, the γνῶθι σεαυτόν with which Nicholas of Cusa opens his *De docta ignorantia* "n'est plus le 'Connais-toi toi-même' du psychologue Socrate, c'est le 'Sois maître de toi' (= Dh 160, 380, *attā hi attano nātho*) des moralistes stoïciens" (*Au tour de la docte ignorance*, Münster, 1915, p. 42). In the same way, the only *raison d'être* of "Buddhist psychology" is not "scientific," but to break down the illusion of self. The modern psychologist's only concern and curiosity are with the all-too-human self, that very self which even in its highest and least suspected extensions is still a prison. Traditional metaphysics has nothing in common with this psychology, which restricts itself to "what can be psychically experienced" (Jung's own definition).

Tradition, then, differs from the "nothing-morist" (Skr. *nāstika*, Pāli *natthika*) in affirming a spiritual nature that is not in any wise, but immeasurable, innumerable, infinite, and inaccessible to observation, and of which, therefore, empirical science can neither affirm nor deny the reality. It is to this "spirit"⁶ (Gk. πνεῦμα, Skr. *ātman*, Pāli *attā*, Arabic *rūh*, etc.) as distinguished from body and soul—i.e., whatever is phenomenal and formal (Gk. σῶμα and ψυχή, Skr. and Pāli *nāma-rūpa*, and *saviññāṇa-kāya*, *saviññāṇa-kāya*, "name and appearance," the "body with its consciousness")—that tradition attributes with perfect consistency an absolute liberty, spatial and temporal. Our sense of free will is as valid in itself as our sense of being, and as invalid as our sense of being So-and-so. There is a free will, a will, that is, unconstrained by anything external to its own nature; but it is only "ours" to the extent that we have abandoned all that we mean in common sense by "ourselves" and our "own" willing. Only *His* service is perfect freedom. "Fate lies in the created causes themselves" (*Sum. Theol.* 1.116.2); "Whatever departeth farthest from the First Mind is involved more deeply in the meshes of Fate [i.e., *karma*, the ineluctable operation of "mediate causes"]; and everything is so much freer from Fate by how much it draweth nigh to the pivot of all things. And if it sticketh to the constancy of the Supernal Mind, that needs not move, it is superior to the necessity of Fate" (Boethius, *De consolazione philosophiae*, prose iv). This freedom of the Unmoved Mover ("that which, itself at rest, outgoeth them that run," *Īśā Up.* iv) from any *necessitas coactionis* is that of the spirit that bloweth where and as it will (*ὅπου θέλει πνεῦ*, John 3:8; *carati yathā vaśam*, RV x.168.4).⁷ To possess it, one must have been "born again . . . of the Spirit" (John 3:7-8) and thus "in the spirit" (St. Paul, *passim*), one must have "found and awakened to the Spirit" (*yasyānuvittaḥ pratibuddha ātmā*, BU iv.4.13), must be in *excessus*

⁶ The phenomena of this "spirit" (the realizations of its possibilities of manifestation under given conditions) are all phenomena whatever, among which those called "spiritualistic" have no privileged rank; on the contrary, "a mouse is miracle enough. . . ."

⁷ RV x.168.3-4, John 3:7-8, and *Gylfaginning* 18 present remarkable parallels [cf. *Edda Snorra Sturlusonar með Skáldatali*, ed. Guðni Jónsson (Reykjavik, 1935).—ED.].

⁸ "He who sees, thinks and discriminates this Spirit, whose pleasure and play are with the Spirit, whose dalliance is with the Spirit [as in BU iv.3.21, "All creation is female to God"] and whose joy is in the Spirit, he becomes autonomous (*svarāj*), he becomes a Mover-at-will (*kāmācārin*) in every world; but the worlds of him whose knowledge is otherwise than this are corruptible, he does not become a Mover-at-will in any world" (CU vii.25.2). The conception of motion-at-will is developed in many texts, from RV ix.113.9, "Make me undying there where motion

("gone out of" oneself, one's senses), in *samādhi* (etymologically and semantically "synthesis"), unified (*eko bhūtaḥ*, cf. *ekodi-bhāva*), or in other words "dead" in the sense that "the kingdom of God is for none but the thoroughly dead" (Eckhart), and in the sense that Rūmī speaks of a "dead man walking" (*Mathnawī* VI.742-755), or again that of initiatory death as the prelude to a regeneration. There is not, of course, any necessary connection between liberation and physical death:⁹ a man can as well be liberated "now in the time of this life" (*ditṭhe va dhamme parinibbuto, jīvan mukta*) as at any other time, all depending only upon his remembering "who he is," and this is the same as to forget oneself, to "hate one's own life" (psyche, "soul," or "self," Luke 14:26), *deficere a se tota* and *a semetipsa liquescere* (St. Bernard),¹⁰ the "death of the soul" (Eckhart),

is at will" (*yatrānukāmaṃ caranam . . . mām amṛtam kṛdhi*), onwards. The Christian equivalent can be found in John 3:8 and 10:9 ("shall go in and out, and find pasture," as in TU III.10.5, "he goes up and down these worlds, eating what he will and assuming what aspect he will").

Motion-at-will is a necessary consequence of filiation or deification, the Spirit moving "as it will" in virtue of its omni- and total presence and because "he that is joined unto the Lord is one Spirit" (1 Cor. 6:17), all possession of "powers" (*rddhi, iddhi*, such as flying through the air or walking on the water) being gifts of the Spirit and depending upon a more or less *ablatio omnis alteritatis et diversitatis* (Nicholas of Cusa). In other words, our freedom and beatitude are the less the more we are still "ourselves," *un tel*. The "miracle" is never an "impossibility," but only so according to our way of thinking: performance is always the demonstration of a possibility. It is not opposites (as "possible" and "impossible"), but contraries—for example, rest and motion—both of which are "possibles," that are reconciled *in divinis*. "Primitive" languages retain the stamp of this polarity in words which may mean either of two contrary things (cf. Freud on Abel, "Gegensinn der Urwort" in *Jahrbuch für psychoanalytische und psychopathologische Forschungen*, II 1910, and Betty Heilmann, "The Polarity of the Infinite," JISOA, V, 1937).

It may be added that because of the identity of the immanent and transcendent Spirit (1 Cor. 6:17; "That art thou" of the Upaniṣads, etc.), we make no real distinction in the present article between "my spirit" (the "ghost" that we "give up" at death) and "the Spirit" (the Holy Ghost), although sometimes writing "spirit" with reference to the immanent essence (*antarātman*) and "Spirit" with reference to the transcendent essence (*paramātman*). So far as a distinction can be made, it is "logical but not real" (*secundum rationem, non secundum rem*).

⁹ "Then shall the dust return to the earth as it was: and the spirit shall return unto God who gave it" (Eccl. 12:7). Our sense of being may be "in the spirit" or "in the dust," and so either "saved or lost." It is well for him "who has been of strength to awaken before the body is unstrung" (KU VI.4).

¹⁰ For St. Bernard, see Étienne Gilson, *La Théologie mystique de Saint Bernard* (Paris, 1934), ch. 5. How close to Indian formulation St. Bernard comes appears in his distinction of *proprium* from *esse* (*mama* from *attā*) and in Rousselet's summary (*ibid.*, p. 150, n. 2) "Cela revient à dire qu'on ne peut pleinement posséder Dieu sans pleinement se posséder soi-même," at the same time that (*ibid.*, p. 152, n. 1)

"nothing else than that the spirit goeth out of itself, out of time, and entereth into a pure nothingness" (Johannes Tauler), becoming thus "free as the Godhead in its non-existence" (Eckhart); to have said "Thy will be done, not mine" or, in other words, to have been perfected in "Islām."¹¹

Man has thus two selves, lives or "souls," one physical, instinctive, and mortal, the other spiritual and not in any way conditioned by time or space, but of which the life is a Now "where every where and every when is focused" (*Paradiso* XXIX.12), and "apart from what has been or shall be" (KU II.14), that "*now* that stands still" of which we as temporal beings, knowing only a past and future, can have no empirical experience. Liberation is not a matter only of shaking off the physical body—oneself is not so easily evaded—but, as Indian texts express it, of shaking off all bodies, mental or psychic as well as physical. "The word of God is quick and powerful, and sharper than any two-edged sword, piercing even to the dividing asunder of soul (*ψυχή*) and spirit (*πνεῦμα*)" (Heb. 4:12). It is between these two that our choice lies: between ourselves as we are in ourselves and to others, and ourselves as we are in God—not forgetting that, as Eckhart says, "Any flea as it is in God is higher than the highest of the angels as he is in himself." Of these two "selves" the psychophysical

"Il n'y a plus de *suam*, l'être s'est vidé de lui-même," as in ŚB III.8.1.2-3, where the initiated sacrificer is "as if emptied out of himself" (*iricāna ivātmā bhavati*) in order to enter into possession of his "whole self" (*sarvātmanam*), or as in A 1.249, where the man who "has brought into full being body, will and foreknowing (*bhāvita-kāyo, citto, pañño*—i.e., whole self) is not emptied out (*aparito = apririkta*) but the Great Spiritual-Self of which the way is beyond all measure (*mahattā appamāṇa vihāri*)."

¹¹ As far as possible this clear distinction of "Soul" (*ψυχή, anima, naṣ, vedanā*, etc.) from "spirit" (*πνεῦμα, spiritus, rūh, ātman*, etc.) is maintained in the present article; cf. Origen, cited by Eckhart (Pfeiffer ed., p. 531) "dīn geist ist dīr niht genomen: die krefte dīner sēle sint dīr genomen" ("It is not thy spirit, but the powers of thy soul [= *indriyāni*] that art taken from thee"). It must also be recognized, however, that in the European tradition the word "soul" is used in many senses (for example, "animal" is literally "ensouled," *anima* here as *spiraculum vitae*; cf. Skr. *prāṇa-bhṛt*) and that in one of these senses (which is strictly that of Philo's "soul of the soul," *Heres* LV; cf. Augustine, *De duobus animabus contra Manicheos*) "soul" means "spirit." In what sense "soul" is or is not to be taken to mean "spirit" is discussed by William of Thierry in the *Golden Epistle*, I (p. 87 in Walter Shewring's English version, London, 1930). In the same way, *ātman* may refer to the psychophysical "self" or to the spiritual self; from the latter point of view, the psychophysical self is *anattā*, "not spiritual!"

It is because both "soul" and "spirit" are selves, although of very different orders, that an equivocation is inevitable. The use of the words in their context has always to be very carefully considered; the proper sense can always be made out.

and spiritual, one is the "life" (*ψυχή*) to be rejected and the other the "life" that is thereby saved (Luke 17:33 and Matt. 16:25), and of these again the former is that "life" (*ψυχή*) which "he who hateth . . . in this world shall keep it unto life eternal" (John 12:25) and which a man *must* hate, "if he would be my disciple" (Luke 14:26). It is assuredly all that is meant by *psyche* in our "psychology" that is in this way *le moi haïssable*; all of us, in fact, that is subject to affects or affections or wants of any sort, or entertains "opinions of his own."¹²

The unknown author of the *Cloud of Unknowing* is therefore altogether in order when he says so poignantly (ch. 44) that "All men have matter of sorrow: but most specially he feeleth matter of sorrow, that wotteth and feeleth that he is. . . . And whoso never felt this sorrow, he may make sorrow: for why, he never yet felt perfect sorrow."¹³ This sorrow, when it is had . . . maketh a soul able to receive that joy, the which reeveth from a man all witting and feeling of his being." And so also William Blake, when he says, "I would go down unto Annihilation and Eternal Death, lest the Last Judgment come and find me Unannihilate, and I be seiz'd and giv'n into the hands of my own Selfhood."¹⁴ In the same way St. Paul, *vivo, autem jam non ego: vivit vero in me Christus* (Gal. 2:20) [and Rūmī, "He has died to self and become living through the Lord" (*Mathnawī* III.3364)].

¹² Cf. the citation from Jacob Boehme at the head of this article. It is comparatively easy for us to admit that a "self-willing" is egotistical; it is far more difficult but equally indispensable to realize that a "self-thinking"—i.e., "thinking for oneself" or "having opinions of one's own"—is as much an error or "sin," defined as "any departure from the order to the end," as any wilfulness can be. A good case of "thinking for oneself" is what is called the "free examination of scripture"; here, as was remarked by David MacIver, "the number of possible objections to a point of doctrine is equal to the number of ways of misunderstanding it, and therefore infinite."

¹³ *Vairāgya*, "dis-gust," as distinguished from *āśa bhanga*, "disappointment": *neḥ-ḥamāna-sita* as distinguished from *geha-sita* in S IV.232 and in Mil 76. Cf. *κατὰ θεὸν λύπη* as distinguished from *τοῦ κόσμου λύπη* in 1 Cor. 7:10.

¹⁴ As remarked by St. Thomas Aquinas (*Sum. Theol.* 1.63.3), "no creature can attain a higher grade of nature without ceasing to exist," which self-denial is a thing "against the natural desire." It is not of its "own" will that the creature can desire its own "annihilation" or "death" [cf. Meister Eckhart, Evans ed., I, 274]. But our consciousness of being (as distinguished from any conceit of being So-and-so or Such-and-such) is precisely *not* the "creature"; it is another will in me than "mine," the lover of another (S IV.158) self than "mine" that "longs intensely for the Great Self" (*mahattam abhikṣhankatā*, A II.21)—i.e., for Itself. This does not pertain to *our* self-love, but God's, who is in all things self-intent and loves no one but himself. ["Thus we understand how a life perishes. . . . If it will not give itself up to death, then it cannot attain any other world" (Boehme, *Sex puncta* v.10).]

We are sometimes shocked by the Buddhist disparagement of natural affections and family ties [cf. MU VI.28, "If to son and wife and family he is attached—for such a one, no, never at all!"]. But it is not the Christian who can thus recoil, for no man can be Christ's disciple "and hate not his father, and mother, and wife, and children, and brethren, and sisters," as well as himself (Luke 14:26 [cf. Plato, *Phaedo* 68A]). These unpromising words, from one who endorsed the command to honor father and mother and who equated contempt with murder, show clearly enough that it is not an ethical doctrine of unselfishness or altruism that we are dealing with but a purely metaphysical doctrine of the transcending of individuation. It is in the same sense that he exclaims, "Who is my mother, or my brethren?" (Mark 3:33, etc.), and accordingly that Meister Eckhart warns, "As long as thou still knowest who thy father and thy mother have been in time, thou art not dead with the real death" (Pfeiffer ed., p. 462).

There can be no return of the prodigal, no "turning in" (*nivṛtti*), except of same to same. "Whoever serves a God, of whom he thinks that 'He is one and I another,' is an ignoramus" (BU I.4.10); "If then you do not make yourself equal to God, you cannot apprehend God: for like is known by like" (Hermes, *Lib.* XI.2.20b). The question is asked of the one who comes home, "Who art thou?" and if he answers by his own or a family name, he is dragged away by the factors of time on the threshold of success (JUB III.14.1-2):¹⁵ ". . . that ill-fated soul is dragged back again, reverses its course, and having failed to know itself, lives in bondage to un-

¹⁵ The traveler, at the end of life's journey (not necessarily on his deathbed), knocks at the Sundoor (as in JUB, etc.), which is the door of the house of Death (as in KU) and that of Yama's paradise (as in RV), and would be received as a guest or, as expressed in Pāli, *amata-dvāram āhacca tiṭṭhati* (S II.43). Admission, however, depends upon anonymity, with all its implications of "being in the spirit" (*ātmany etya mukha ādatte*, "going in the spirit, the gate accepts him," JUB III.33.8). There can be no doubt that the same mythical and profound eschatology underlies the Homeric legend of Ulysses and Polyphemus. The latter is assuredly Death. (His one eye corresponds to Śiva's third; that it is blinded and thus "closed" means that the world illumined by sun and moon, the *two* eyes of the gods, is to persist for Ulysses and his companions. It must be an initiatory, not a final death that is overcome, as is also suggested by the "cave".) His land which yields crops untilld is a Paradise, like Yama's or Varuṇa's; Ulysses would be his guest. The story, as told by Homer (and Euripides), has become an adventure rather than a myth, but it remains that the hero who overcomes Death is the one man who when he is asked, "Who art thou?" answers, "No one"; and it is noteworthy that in the Euripides version, when the blinded Cyclops cries out, "Where is Nobody?" the chorus answers, "Nowhere, O Cyclops." It would be hard to say whether Homer still "understood his material"; it may be taken for granted that Euripides did not.

couth and miserable bodies. The fault of this soul is its ignorance"¹⁶ (Hermes, *Lib.* x.8a). He should answer, "Who I am is the light Thou art. What heavenly light Thou art, as such I come to Thee," and answering thus is welcomed accordingly, "Who thou art, that am I; and who I am, art thou. Come in" (JUB III.14.3-4). To the question, "Who is at the door?" he answers, "Thou art at the door," and is welcomed with the words, "Come in, O myself" (Rūmī, *Mathnawī* 1.3062-3). It is not as *un tel* that he can be received—"Whoever enters, saying 'I am So-and-so,' I smite him in the face" (*Shams-i-Tabriz*); as in Song of Solomon 1:7, *si ignoras te, . . . egredere*.

"He that is joined unto the Lord is one spirit" (1 Cor. 6:17). But this Spirit (*ātman*), Brahman, God, the "What?" of JUB III.14, "hath not come anywhence nor become anyone" (KU II.18). The Imperishable has neither personal nor family name (BU III.8.8, *Mādhyamādhina* text) nor any caste (Muṇḍ. Up. 1.1.6); "God himself does not know what he is, because he is not any what"¹⁷ (Erivgena); the Buddha is "neither priest nor prince nor husbandman nor any one at all (*ḥoci no'mhi*). . . . I wander in the world a veritable naught (*ākimcana*). . . . Useless to ask my kin" (*gottam*, Sn 455-456).¹⁸

¹⁶ Cf. Dh 243 where, after a list of "faults," we have: "the supreme fault is ignorance" (*saviijā paramam malam*).

¹⁷ The deformed soul in which an *ablatis omnibus alteritatis et diversitatis* has been effected (Nicholas of Cusa) is therefore beyond our speechways (*vādapatha*, Sn 1076); "unknown to herself or any creature, she knows well that she is, but she does not know what she is" (Meister Eckhart, Pfeiffer ed., p. 537).

¹⁸ In the same way, the famous ode xxxi of *Shams-i-Tabriz* [Rūmī, *Divān*], ". . . I know not myself . . . ; I am not of Adam nor of Eve . . . ; my place is the Placeless, my trace is the Traceless; nor body nor life, since I am of the life of the Beloved" (*na tan nāsad na jān nāsad, ki man az jān jānān-am*). Nicholson comments: "'I am nought' means 'God is all.'" From the Indian point of view, the "Beloved" is, of course, "the Spirit, which is also one's own spiritual essence"—"For one who has attained, there is none dearer than the Spirit" or "than the Self" (*na piyatarā attanā*, S 1.75; cf. BU 1.4.8, *tad etat preyaḥ putrāt . . . yād ayaṃ ātmā . . . ātmānam eva priyam upāśita*; BU II.4; BU IV.5; CU VII.25; [Muṇḍ. Up. 1.2.1 ff.]; etc.). With "traceless" compare Dh 179, *taṃ buddham anantaḥgocaram padam, keṇa padena nessatha*, "that Buddha, whose pasture is without end, the footless [or trackless], by what track can you find him out?" (This is complementary to the usual doctrine of the *vestigium pedis*, according to which the intelligible Buddha [or Agni] can be tracked by his spoor, *pādā* or *padāni*.) Cf. Coomaraswamy, *Elements of Buddhist Iconography*, 1935, nn. 145 ff. "A Tathāgata, I say, is actually (*dharmme*) beyond our ken" (*anānuvejjo*, M 1.140 [similarly *anupalabbhi yamāno*, S III.112]); and in the same way of Arhats "there is no demonstration" (*vaṭṭam tesam natthi paññāpanāya*; S 141): "Him neither gods nor men can see" (*taṃ ce hi nādaḥkhum*, S 1.23). The last is spoken in the Buddha's physical presence and corresponds to the

Having drawn the outlines of the universal doctrine of self-naughting and of self-sacrifice or devotion in the most literal sense of the words, we propose to devote the remainder of our demonstration to its specifically Buddhist formulation in terms of *ākimcaññāyatana*, "the Station of No-what-ness," or, more freely, "the Cell of Self-naughting." "When it is realized that 'There is no aught' (*n'atthi kimci*), that is 'Emancipation of the Will'¹⁹ (*ceto-vimutti*) in the 'Station of No-what-ness'" (S IV.296 and M 1.297; cf. D II.112). The exact meaning of "There is naught"—i.e.,

well-known text of the *Vajracchedikā Sūtra*, "Those who see me in the body (*rūpena*) or think of me in words, they do not see me at all, their way of thinking is mistaken; the Blessed Ones are to be seen only in the Body of the Law, the Buddha can only be rightly understood as the principle of the Law, assuredly not by any means." Cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, "Therefore if anyone in seeing God conceives something in his mind, this is not God, but one of God's effects" (*Sum. Theol.* III.92.1 ad 4); "We have no means for considering what God is, but rather how He is not" (I.3.1). [Cf. Hermes, *Lib.* XIII.3, οὐκ ὁφθαλμοῖς τοιοῦτοις θεωροῦμαι, ὃ τέκνον. "The new man, being incorporeal, can be seen only with 'the eyes of the mind.'" Cf. JUB IV.19 and *The Doctrine of the Sūfis*, A. J. Arberry, tr. (Cambridge, 1935), p. 34.]

¹⁹ *Ceto-vimutti* (often rendered "heart's release") in contrasted with *paññā-vimutti*, "intellectual emancipation," *ceto* and *paññā* denoting both the means or way of liberation and the respect in which liberation is obtained. The texts often speak of a "being free in both departments" *ubhato-bhāga-vimutti*, as well as of other types of liberation, and it is evident that the two ways, which are those of the will and the intellect, converge and ultimately coincide. A II.36, *ceto-vasipatto hoti vitakka-pathesu*, "He is a past master of the will in matters of choice [or 'matters of counsel']," brings out very clearly the conative connotations of *ceto*, which are evident also for *cetas* in AV VI.116.3. S III.60 defines *sankhārā* as *samcetanā*, rendered by Rhys Davids "seats of will." It is clear, then, that the connection of *ceto-vimutti* with *ākimcaññā* is intrinsic, since it is just to the extent that one ceases to feel that one is anyone and to the extent that one loses all sense of *proprium* (*mama*) that self-willing and self-thinking must cease. It is just because *ceto* implies both willing and thinking that it is difficult to represent it by a single English word; however, it is in just the same way that English "to have a mind to" is the same as "to wish to" or "to want to" and so, too, that Skr. *man*, to "think," and *kaṃ*, to "wish" or "want," are virtually synonymous in many contexts. *Paññā* is not, of course, "thought" in this sense, but much rather "speculation" in the strict sense of this word (*ādiye mahat . . . ādarṣe prativṛṣṭi* Kauṣ. Up. IV.2, with very many Christian and other parallels—e.g., *Sum. Theol.* I.12.9c, "All things are seen in God as in an intelligible mirror," i.e., the *speculum aeternum*). It is asked in M 1.437, how is it that some are liberated in one way and some in the other, the Buddha replying that it depends upon "a difference in faculties" (*indriya-vevattatam*). The difference is, in fact, typically that of the royal from the sacerdotal, Kṣatriya from Brāhman character; because of this difference a *bhakti-mārga* and *karma-mārga* are stressed in the *Bhagavad Gītā* and a *jñāna-mārga* in the Upaniṣads. The two ways of *ceto-vimutti* (in *Itivuttaka* 27, identified with *mettā*, "charity") and *paññā-vimutti* correspond to and are essentially the same as the *bhakti-mārga* and *jñāna-mārga* of Brahmanical texts.

"naught of mine"²⁰—is brought out in A 11.177: "The Brāhman²¹ speaks the truth and no lie when he says 'I am naught of an anyone anywhere, and therein there is naught of mine anywhere soever'" (*nāhaṃ kvacani kassaci kīṃcanam, tasmim na ca mama kvacani katthaci kīṃcanam n'atthi*; also in M 11.263–264),²² the text continuing, "Therewith he has no conceit of being 'a Toiler' (*samaṇa*) or 'a Brahman,' nor conceit that 'I am better than' or 'I am equal to' or 'inferior to' (anyone). Moreover, by a full comprehension of this truth, he reaches the goal of veritable 'naughting' (*ākīṃcaññam yeva paṭipadam*)."²³ What is neither "I" nor "mine" is above all body, sensibility, volitional conformations, and empirical consciousness (i.e., the psychophysical self), and to have rejected these is "for your best good and beatitude" (S 111.33; the chapter is entitled *Natumahāka*, "What Is Not 'Yours'"). Accordingly, "Behold the Arhats' beatitude! No wanting can be found in them: excised the thought 'I am' (*asmi*);²³ delusion's net is rent. . . . Unmoving, unoriginated . . . Brahma-

²⁰ It will be seen that the Arhat or Brāhman who has attained to self-naughting and confesses accordingly *n'atthi* or *n'atthi kīṃci* might have been called a *natthika* or *natthikavādi* ("denier"). If he is never in fact so called (but, rather, *śūnyavādi*), it is because these were designations current in a very different sense, with reference namely to the "materialist" or "skeptical" who denies that there is another world or hereafter (as in M 1.402–403) or takes the extreme view (*natthitā*) that there is absolutely nothing in common between the individual that acts and the individual that experiences the results of the acts (S 11.17). We propose to discuss this other "denier" upon another occasion.

²¹ Pāli Buddhism not only equates *brahma-bhūta* with *buddha*, *brahma-caṅka* with *dhamma-caṅka*, etc., but (where there is no polemic involved) maintains the old and familiar distinction of the Brāhman by birth (*brahma-bandhu*) from the Brāhman as Comprehensor (*brahma-vit*), in the latter sense equating Brāhman with Arhat.

²² *Netti* 183 (cited in a note on A 1.203) explains *kīṃcana* here by *rāga-dosa-moha*—i.e., ethically—and this is true in the sense that when self is let go, there remains no ground for any "selfish" passion; *kīṃcana* is the "somewhat" of the man who still feels that he is "somebody" and accordingly the ground in which interest, ill-will, and delusion can flourish.

In all respects equivalent to *n'atthi* (Skr. *nāsti*) is Persian *nēst* in *Shams-i-Tabriz* (T 139.12a, cited by Nicholson, p. 233), "Be thou naught (*nēst shū*), naughted of self, for there is no crime more heinous than thine existence."

²³ This does not imply that the Arhat "is not," but excludes from an ineffable essence the process of thought. From this point of view, *cogito ergo sum* is altogether without validity; what I call "my" thinking is by no means my Self. The Arhat does not wonder whether he is, what he is, or how he is, has been, or will be (S 11.26, Sn 774). "He does not worry about what is unreal" (*asatti na paritassati*, M 1.136); he is self-synthesized (*ajjhataṃ susamāhito, passim*), and in this state of synthesis (*samādhi*), though he is unaware of anything, "yet there is awareness in him" (S v.74; cf. BU 1v.3.28–30). The Buddha neither teaches that *nibbāna* is a "nothingness" nor that the Arhat "comes to naught": "There is (*atthi*) an unborn, unbecome, un-

become . . . true 'Persons' (*sappurisa*), natural sons of the Wake. . . . That heart-wood of the Brahma-life is their eternal reason; unshaken in whatever plight, released from 'still becoming' (*punabbhava*), on ground of 'dompted [-self]' they stand, they in the world have won their battle. . . . They roar the 'Lion's Roar.' Incomparable are the Wake (*arahanta*, S 111.83–84, 159).²⁴ There is no question of a post-mortem "annihilation" here, then, but of "Persons" triumphant here and now; their unconditionality will not be changed by death, which is not an event for those who have "died before they die" (*Rūmī*), not an event for the *jīvan-mukta*, the veritable *dīkṣita* for whom the funeral rites have already been performed and for whom his relatives have already mourned (JUB 111.7.9). Of these it is only the manifestation in terms of "name and appearance" (*nāma-rūpa*) that comes to an end (as all things must that have had a beginning), so that after death they will be sought for in vain by Devas or men in this world or any other (S 1.123, D 1.46, etc.), just as one might seek in vain for a God *anywhere*, of whom it is asked "Whence did he come to be?" (*kuta ā babbhūva*, RV x.168.3), "In what quarter is He or in what?" (TS v.4.3.4) and "Who knows where He is?" (KU 11.25): Thou "canst not tell whence it cometh, and whither it goeth: so is every one that is born of the Spirit" (John 3:8). In spite of this, however, it must be remarked that the attainment of infinity is not a destruction of finite possibility, for the deceased Comprehensor, being a Mover-at-will (*kā-mācārin*), can always therefore reappear if, when, where, and as he will. Examples of this "resurrection" may be cited in JUB 111.29–30 (where the *noli me tangere* offers a notable parallel to the Christian resurrection), and in the *Parosahassa Jātaka* (No. 99), where a Bodhisattva is asked on his deathbed, "What good has he gotten?," and he answers: "There is naught" (*n'atthi kīṃci*), which is misunderstood by his disciples to

created, uncompounded, and were there not, there would be no way out here of this born, become, created and compounded existence" (Ud 80); a Tathāgata (see Coomaraswamy, "Some Pāli Words" [in this volume—ED.]) whose "I am" has been cast off" (*asmimāno pahīno*) is not "destroyed"—"It is in the very presence of such a Tathāgata that I call him 'past finding out' (*anānuvejjo*), and yet there are some who naughtily, vainly, falsely, and contrary to what is the fact (*asatā tucchā musā abhūtena*) charge that the Tathāgata is a misleader (*venayika*; cf. *dunnaya*, heresy) who propounds the cutting off, destruction, and ceasing to be of essences. That is just what I am not, and what I do not propound. The stoppage (*nirodha*) that I have reached, both of old and now, is nothing but the stoppage of Grief (*dukkha*—i.e., of that which is *anattā*, not I nor mine)," M 1.139–140. (The coincidence of *anattā* with *dukkha* corresponds exactly to the *esa ta ātmā sarvāntaraḥ ato'nyad artam* of BU 111.4.2.)

mean that he had gotten "no good" by his holy life. But when the conversation is reported to his chief disciple, who had not been present, he says "You have not understood the meaning of the Master's words. What the Master said was that he had attained to the 'Station of No-what-ness' (*ākimcaññāyatana*)."²⁴ And thereupon the deceased Master reappears from the Brahma-world to confirm the chief disciple's explanation.²⁵

The man self-naughted is a happy man; not so those still conscious of their human ties. "Look you, how they are blest, these 'Nobodies,' yea these Comprehensors who are 'men of naught': and see how hindered he for whom there is an 'aught,' the man whose mind is tied up with 'other men'" (Ud 14).²⁶ For "to have known the forthcoming of not being 'anyone' (*ākimcaññā-sambhavam nātvā*) . . . that is 'gnosis' (*etam nānam*, Sn 1115)"; this is the Way, "Perceiving that there is 'No-what-ness' (*ākimcaññam*) . . . convinced that 'There is not' (*n'atthi*—i.e., 'naught mine,' as above), so cross the flood" (Sn 1070). And this is not an easy matter: "Hard to perceive what's false (*anattam*; here probably = *anr-tam*),²⁷ nor is it easy to perceive the truth (*saccam* = *satyam*); he knows,

²⁴ It is worthy of note that Ālāra Kālāma's doctrine and realization extended to the experience of *ākimcaññāyatana* (M 1.165).

²⁵ Again a sufficient proof that even in "late" Hinayāna Buddhism to have become "no one" was by no means the same as to have been "annihilated." The Buddhist position is in no way inconsistent with the "never have I not been and never hast thou not been . . . nor ever shall not be" of BG 11.12. It should be observed that the resurrections of JUB 11.29–30 and the *Jātaka* as cited above are wholly "in order" and have nothing in common with the phenomenon of spiritualism. It is as much a Buddhist as a Brāhmanical commonplace that "the dead are not seen again amongst the living," as asked in the *Jātaka*; cf. CU viii.13–14.

²⁶ In context the reference is to a man who steals for his wife. The contrasted terms are *akimcana*, "man of naught," and *sakimcana*, "man of aught," the man, that is, who "has" what he calls "his" individuality, which individuality in this case "expresses itself" in an act of partiality. This "man of aught" is hindered by the notions of "himself" and of "his" wife, the "tie" being as between these two selves, subjective and objective; insofar as he does not "hate" both himself and his wife, he is not the Buddha's disciple but is troubled and gets into trouble. In all these contexts it must be remembered that it is a question of the *summum bonum* and man's last end, and not of the "good of society," which is not a final end. The man's first duty is to work out his own salvation (Dh 166). Abandonment of self and of all ties is not only literally "un-self-ish," but it is also both better and kinder to point out the way to happiness by following it than to be "sympathetic"—i.e., to "suffer with"—those who will not "seek peace, and ensue it."

²⁷ The PTS editor, Paul Steinthal, reads *anattam*, but ms A, admittedly the best manuscript, has *anatam*, which is the form that would be assumed by *anrtam* in Pāli (cf. *amrtam*, *amatam*). A commentary has *anatam*, but apparently in the sense of the "not-bent," hence *nibbāna*, and it must be with this in view that Woodward trans-

whose wanting has been smitten through, who sees that "There is naught" (*n'atthi kīmcānam*, Ud 80); "who hath overpast becoming or not becoming in any way" (*iti-bhavābhavam*, all relativity, Ud 20).²⁸

It will be seen that anonymity is an essential aspect of *ākimcaññā*. All initiations (*diṅṣā*) and, likewise, Buddhist ordination (*pabbajana*), which as in monasticism elsewhere is a kind of initiation,²⁹ involve at the outset a self-denial.³⁰ This is explicit in Ud 55, where "Just as rivers lose their

lates "infinite." But it is almost impossible to doubt that what we have is the familiar antithesis of *anytam* to *satyam*. The uncertainty of the reading nevertheless expresses a sort of *double entendre*; that which is *anattā*, "not what I really am" (*na me so attā, passim*) but "devoid of any spiritual-essence" (S iv.54) and "naught-y" (*asat*, M 1.136), is equally from the Brahmanical point of view at the same time "false" and "human" as distinguished from what is "true" and "non-human"—i.e., divine—as is explicit in VS 1.5 and ŚB 1.9.3.23 (cf. AB vii.24), where the sacrificer (always in the last analysis the sacrificer of himself) when initiated and during the performance of the rite "has entered from the untruth (*anytam*) into the truth (*satyam*)" and when at the close of the operation he formally desecrates himself, but does not like to say plainly the converse of this and so says instead, "Now I am he that I actually (empirically) am," So-and-so.

²⁸ "It is the Spirit in thee, O man, that knows which is the true and which the false (*attā te purisa jānāti saccam vā yadi vā musā*)—the 'fair self' (*kalyāṇam* . . . *attānam*) . . . or the 'foul' (*pāpam attānam*)" (A 1.149), in other words the "great self" (*mahattā*) or the "petty" (*app'ātumo*) of A 1.249, the "Self that is Lord of self" or the "self whose Lord is the Self" of Dh 380. The false view is to see "self in not-self" (*anattani* . . . *attā*, A 11.42, etc.)—i.e., in the empirical subject or its percepts (S 11.130, etc.). It is "well for him that knows himself" (*atta-saññato*, S 1.106; *attaññū*, D 11.252), "whose light is the Spirit" (*atta-dīpa*, D 11.100), the "self-lover" (*attakāmo*, S 1.75, etc.), "inwardly self-synthesized" (*ajjhatam susamāhito*, A 11.31, etc.), "in whom the Spirit has been fully brought to birth" (*bhāvitattā, passim*). "Go seek your Self" (*attānam gaveseyyātha*, Vin 1.23; *attānam gavesitum*, Vis 393). "Quickened thy Self" (*coday'attānam*, Dh 379), for "self is the Lord of self" (Vis 380).

²⁹ The initiate is "nameless" in KB vii.2–3 and speaks of none by name; he is not himself, but Agni. In ŚB 11.8.1.2, he is "emptied of self." Buddhist ordination (*pabbajana* from the point of view of the ordained, *pabbajana* from that of the ordainer, who during the Buddha's lifetime is the Buddha himself) has many of the characteristics of, and is sometimes called, an initiation (S 1.226; Commentary [= ŚA 1.346] explains *cira-diṅṣita*, "long since initiated," by *cira-pabbajita* "long since ordained"; cf. J v.138). In *Jātakamāla* x.32, a Bodhisatva is *diṅṣita*.

The primary senses of *pabbajati* are to "wander, travel," and "be in exile," and so, to become a fellow in the "Companionship" (*sangha*) of Mendicant Travelers (*bhikkhu, pabbajaka*), a true Wayfarer; cf. Coomaraswamy, "The Pilgrim's Way," and "The Pilgrim's Way, A Buddhist Recension," 1938 (article in two parts); the Traveler is bound for a world's End that is within himself.

³⁰ The ethical aspect of this self-denial is a dispositive means to the end of self-naughting and self-realization, not an end in itself. *Tapas*, whether Brahmanical

former name and lineage (*purimāni nāma-gottāni*) when they reach the sea, and are accounted just as 'the great sea,' so men of the four castes (*brāhmaṇa khattiyā vessā suddā*), when they 'as-wanderers-are-ordained' (*pabbajitvā*), discard their former names and lineage, and are reckoned only to be 'Toilers, Sons of the Sakyan.' It is thus that the "exile" (*pabbajaka*) sets to work to "de-form himself of himself," as Eckhart expresses it (*daz er sich entbilde sin selbes*) or, in other words, to "transform" himself.

The anonymity which we have described above as a doctrinally inculcated principle is by no means only a monastic ideal, but has far-reaching repercussions in traditional societies, where our distinctions of sacred from profane (distinctions that are, in the last analysis, the signature of an internal conflict too rarely resolved) can hardly be found. It reappears, for example, in the sphere of art. We have discussed elsewhere "The Traditional Conception of Ideal Portraiture"³¹ (citing, for example, the *Pratimānātaka* III.5, where Bharata, though he exclaims at the artists' skill, is unable to recognize the effigies of his own parents), and we may point out here that there is a corresponding anonymity of the artist himself, not only in the field of the so-called "folk arts" but equally in a more sophisticated environment. Thus, as H. Swarzenski has remarked, "It is in the very nature of Mediaeval Art that extremely few names of artists have been transmitted to us . . . the entire mania of connecting the few names preserved by tradition³² with well-known masterpieces, . . . all this is characteristic of the nineteenth century's cult of individualism, based upon ideals of the Renaissance."³³ Dh 74 exclaims, "May it be known to religious and profane that 'This was my work' . . . that is an

or Buddhist, is never a "penance," but in its disciplinary aspect a part of that training by means of which the petty self is subjected and assimilated to the Great Self or, in a familiar symbolism, by which the steeds are brought under the driver's control, apart from which the man is "at war with himself" (S 1.71-72, like BG VI.5-6); and in its intrinsic character, a radiance, reflecting his "Who glows (*tapati*) yonder."

³¹ Cf. Coomaraswamy, *Why Exhibit Works of Art?* 1943, ch. 7.

³² "History," rather than "tradition" in our stricter sense.

³³ *Journal of the Walters Art Gallery*, I (1938), 55. Cf. Josef Strzygowski, "the artist in Viking times is not to be thought of as an individual, as would be the case today. . . . It is a creative art" (*Early Church Art in Northern Europe*, New York, 1928, pp. 159-160); and with respect to this distinction of "individual" from "creative" art, "I do nothing of myself" (John 8:28), and, "I take note, and even as He dictates within me, I set it forth" (Dante, *Purgatorio* xxiv.52). ["No pronouncement of a prophet is ever his own," Philo, *De specialibus legibus* IV.49; cf. IV.192.] Better to be an amanuensis of the Spirit than to "think for oneself!"

infantile thought."³⁴ DhA 1.270 relates the story of thirty-three youths who are building a "rest hall" at four crossroads, and it is explicit that "The names of the thirty-three comrades did not appear," but only that of Sudhammā, the donor of the roofplate (the keystone of the dome).³⁵ One is irresistibly reminded of the "Millennial Law" of the Shakers that "No one should write or print his name on any article of manufacture, that others may hereafter know the work of his hands."³⁶ And all this has not only to do with the body of the work and its aesthetic surfaces; it has just as much to do with its "weight" (*gravitas*) or essence (*ātman*). The notion of a possible property in ideas is altogether alien to the *Philosophia Perennis*, of which we are speaking. It is of ideas and the inventive power that we can properly say, if we are thinking in terms of the psycho-

³⁴ The words of the original could mean either my "work" or my "doing," *kamma* covering both things made and things done. The same ambiguity, or rather ambivalence, is present in the corresponding text of BG III.27, "One whose self is confounded by the concept of an 'I' imagines that 'I am the doer,'" and V.8, where the Comprehensor does not think of "himself as the doer of anything," the word for "doer," *kartṛ*, meaning equally "maker" or "creator"; cf. JUB 1.5.2, "Thou (God) art the doer," and IV.12.2, "I (God) am the doer" (or "maker"). Like BG, as cited above, is Ud 70, "Those who give ear to the notion 'I am the doer' (*ahaṃkāra*), or are captivated by the notion 'another is the doer' (*paraṃkāra*), do not understand this matter, they have not seen the point."

We need hardly remind the reader that this is a metaphysical position and must not be confused with the *akiriyāvāda* heresy—namely that of the man in Ud 45 who is represented as saying, "even while acting, 'It is not I that am agent' (*yo c'āpi kṛtvā na karamī'ti c'āha*)." "I," "this man," *un tel*, have no right to evade "my" responsibility in this way, by maintaining that it does not matter what I do, because it is not really I that am doing it. It is only when the nonentity of this "I" [which is not "mine" (Dh 62) but an assumption], has been *verified* (*sacchikātvā*) that 'I,' in the sense of 1 John 3:9, being "born of God, . . . cannot sin," or that of Gal. 5:18, am "not under the law."

³⁵ In early Indian art, the names of the donors are constantly met, those of artists almost never. The donor's name is recorded because he wishes to "acquire merit" for what he has done; the artist is not, as such, in this specifically moral sense acquiring merit, but on the one hand earning his wages and on the other working for the good of the work to be done, neither of these points of view implying any wish for fame.

³⁶ Edward and Faith Andrews, *Shaker Furniture* (New Haven, 1937), p. 44. In all these connections, however, it is the spirit rather than the letter that matters. In the same community, for example, furniture could not be owned "as private property, or individual interest" and yet might be marked with a person's initials "for purposes of distinction." And it was, in just the same way, in order for a Buddhist monk to say, "I" or "mine," when convenient (S 1.14). In the same way an artist's signature need not be an advertisement but can be, like a hallmark, a simple guarantee of quality and acceptance of responsibility.

physical ego, that this is not "mine" or—if the self has been naughted, so that, to use the Brāhmaṇa phrase, we have "come into our own"—that these gifts of the Spirit are truly "mine," since it is the Synteresis, the Divine Eros, inwit, "in-genium," immanent spirit, daimon, and not the natural individual that is the ground of the inventive power, and it is precisely this inwit, this intellectual light, and not our own "mentality" of which it is said that "That art thou."

In conclusion, the student must not be misled by such terms as self-naughting, nonbeing, or any other of the phrases of the negative theology. Nonbeing, for example, in such an expression as Eckhart's "nonexistence of the Godhead," is that transcendent aspect of the Supreme Identity which is not, indeed, being, but that to which all being, even God's, can be reduced, as to its principle; it is that of God's which is not susceptible of manifestation, of which, therefore, we cannot speak in terms that are applicable only to states of manifestation, yet without which God would be only a "pantheon," a "pantheistic" deity, rather than "all this" and "more than this," "within" and "without." In the same way, it must be realized that of one assimilated to God by self-naughting and therefore no longer anyone, we have no longer any human means or speechway (*vādapatha*) to say what he is, but only to say that he is not such or such. It would be even more untrue to say that he is not than that he is; he is simply inaccessible to analysis. Even a theoretical grasp of metaphysics is impossible until we have learned that there are "things which our intellect cannot behold . . . we cannot understand what they are except by denying things of them" (Dante, *Convito* III.15) and that these very things are the greater part of man's last end. If, for example, the Arhat no longer desires, it is not because he is in human language "apathetic," but because all desires are possessed, and pursuit has no longer any meaning; if the Arhat no longer "moves," it is not as a stone lies still but because he no longer needs any means of locomotion in order to be anywhere; if he is not curious about empirical truths, whether "this is so" or "not so," it is not because he does not know but because he does not know as we know in these terms. For example, he does not think in terms of past or future, but only is now. If he is "idle," from our point of view who still have "things to do," it is because he is "all in act" (*kṛtakṛtyah*, *katakaraṇīyo*), with an activity independent of time.

But if we cannot know him, it does not follow that he cannot know or manifest himself to us. Just as in this life, while in *samādhi*, he is inac-

cessible and for all practical purposes dead, but on emerging from this synthesis and "returning to his senses" can conveniently make use of such expressions as "I" or "mine" for practical and contingent purposes without attainer of his freedom (S I.14), so after death, by which he is not changed, a resurrection is always possible in any guise (he "shall go in and out, and find pasture," John 10:9, with many Indian parallels—e.g., TU III.5, "he goes up and down these worlds, eating what he desires and assuming what aspect he will"). This possibility by no means excludes that of reappearance in that very (dis-)guise by which he had been known in the world as So-and-so. Examples of such resurrection can be cited not only in the case of Jesus, but in that of Uccaiśśravas Kaupayeya (JUB III.29-30), in that of the Boddhisattva of the *Parosahassa Jātaka*, and in that of the former Buddha Prabhūtaratna. Such a resurrection, indeed, is only one of innumerable "powers" (*iddhi*), such as those of walking on the water, flying through the air, or disappearing from sight, which are possessed by one who is no longer "in himself" but "in the spirit," and inevitably possessed precisely because they are the powers of the Spirit with which he is "one" (1 Cor. 6:17):³⁷ which powers (as listed, for example, in S II.212 ff., A I.255 ff., and S V.254 ff.) are precisely the "greater works" of John 14:12, "the works that I do shall he do also; and greater works than these shall he do." There can, indeed, be no question for those who know the "facts" that insofar as the *yogin* is what the designation implies, "joined unto the Lord," these "powers" are at his command; he is only too well aware, however, that to make of these powers an end in themselves would be to fail of the real end.

It will be seen that in speaking of those who have done what was to be done, we have been describing those who have become "perfect, even as your Father in Heaven is perfect." There will be many to say that even if all this holds good for the all-abandoner, it can have no meaning for "me," and it is true that it cannot have its full meaning for "me" who, *en étant un tel*, am insusceptible of deification and therefore incapable of

³⁷ This unification is to be understood in the same way that the "eternal reasons" are one with the intellect that entertains them and yet distinguishable among themselves, so as to be *in posse* to project their images upon the walls of our cave. Filiation or theosis by an *ablatio omnis alteritatis et diversitatis* can be expressed in terms of "glorification" as a becoming consciously a ray of the Light of lights: the relation of a ray, although of light throughout its course, is that of identity with its source at one end and separate recognizability at the other, where its effect is observed as color. In no better way than by this adequate symbol, made use of in all traditions, can we express or suggest the meaning of Eckhart's "fused but not confused" or Indian *bhedābheda*, "distinction without difference."

reaching God. Few or none of "us" are yet qualified to abandon ourselves. As far as there is a Way, it can be trodden step by step. There is an intellectual preparation, which not merely prepares the way to a verification (*sacchikīriyā*) but is indispensable to it. As long as we love "our" selves and conceive of a "self-denial" only in terms of "altruism," or cling to the idea of a "personal" immortality for our or other selves, we are standing still. But a long stride has been taken if at least we have learned to accept the idea of the naughting of self as a good, however contrary it may be to our "natural" desire, however *allen menschen fremde* (Eckhart). For if the spirit be thus willing, the time will come when the "flesh," whether in this or any other ensemble of possibilities forming a "world," will be no longer weak. The doctrine of self-naughting is therefore addressed to *all*, in measure of their capacity, and by no means only to those who have already formally abandoned name and lineage. It is not the saint, but the sinner, that is called to repent of his existence.



Ātmayajña: Self-Sacrifice

Svasti vah parāya tamasa parastāt

Muṇḍaka Upaniṣad, II.2.6¹

When a man vows to Almighty God all that he has, all his life, all his knowledge, it is a holocaust.

St. Gregory, XX Homily on Ezekiel

Just as Christianity turns upon and in its rites repeats and commemorates a Sacrifice, so the liturgical texts of the *Ṛg Veda* cannot be considered apart from the rites to which they apply, and so are these rites themselves a mimesis of what was done by the First Sacrificers who found in the Sacrifice their Way from privation to plenty, darkness to light, and death to immortality.

The Vedic Sacrifice is always performed for the Sacrificer's benefit, both here and hereafter.² The immediate benefits accruing to the Sacrificer are that he may live out the full term of his life (the relative immortality of "not dying" prematurely) and may be multiplied in his children and in his possessions; the Sacrifice ensuring the perpetual circulation of the "Stream of Wealth" (*vasor dhārā*),³ the food of the gods reaching them in the smoke of the burnt offering, and our food in return descending from heaven in the rain and thus through plants and cattle to ourselves, so that neither the Sacrificer nor his people shall die of want. On the other hand, the ultimate benefit secured to the Sacrificer who thus lives out his life on earth and in good form is that of deification and an absolute

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¹ "Welfare to ye in crossing over to the farther shore of darkness!"

² "For the winning of both worlds," TS VI.6.4.1; "that 'life's best' that has been appointed by the gods to men for this time being and hereafter," Plato, *Timaeus* 90D.

³ TS V.4.8.1, V.7.3.2, 3; ŚB V.4.1.16, VII.3.1.30, IX.3.2, etc.; MU VI.37, BG III.10 ff. The *vasor dhārā* is represented iconographically in the Cakravartin compositions at Jaggayapeta, cf. James Burgess, *Buddhist Stūpas of Amarāvati and Jaggayapeta* (London 1887), pl. LV, fig. 3, etc.

immortality. These distinctions of temporal from eternal goods correspond to that which is sharply drawn in the Brāhmaṇas between a mere performance or patronage of the rites and a comprehension of them, the mere participant securing only the immediate, and the Comprehensor (*evamvit, vidvān, viduḥ*) both ends of the operation (*ṛkarma, vrata*). This is likewise the well-known distinction of the *ṛkarma kṛāṇḍa* and *ṛkarma mārga* from the *jñāna kṛāṇḍa* and *mārga*—a division of *vīae*⁴ that is ultimately resolved when the whole of life is sacrificially interpreted and lived accordingly.

To know Indra as he is in himself is the *summum bonum* (Kauṣ. Up. III.1, cf. AĀ II.2.3); and already RV VIII.70.3 points out that “none attaineth Him by works or sacrifices” (*na . . . ṛkarmaṇā . . . na yajñaiḥ* [cf. ŚB x.5.4.16]). If it is not by any mere activity nor by any ritual means, it is clear that it can only be by an understanding or verification of what is done that he can be found. Here, then, we propose to ask not what is enacted outwardly, but what is accomplished inwardly by the understanding sacrificer.

The Brāhmaṇas abound with evidence that the victim is a representation of the sacrificer himself, or as the texts express it, *is* the sacrificer himself. In accordance with the universal rule that initiation (*dīkṣā*) is a death and a rebirth, it is explicit that “the initiate is the oblation” (*haviṣ vai dīkṣitaḥ*, TS VI.1.4.5; cf. AB II.3), “the victim (*paśu*) substantially (*nidānena*) the sacrificer himself” (AB II.11).⁵ This was to be expected, for it is repeatedly emphasized that “We [the sacrificers here and now] must do what was done by the gods [the original sacrificers] in the beginning.” It is, in fact, himself that the god offers up, as may be seen in the prayers “O Agni, sacrifice thine own body” (*yajasva tanvaṃ tava svām*, RV VI.11.2; cf. I.142.11, *avasṛja upa tmanā*), and “sacrifice thyself, augmenting thy body” (*svayaṃ yajasva tanvaṃ vṛdhānaḥ*, RV x.81.5), [“Worship thyself, O God” (*yajasva tanvaṃ*, RV x.7.6, VI.11.2)]. To sacrifice and to be sacrificed are essentially the same: “For the gods’ sake he chose death, for his offspring’s [the same ‘gods’] sake chose not im-

⁴ The *locus classicus* for the *vīae*, *affirmativa* and *remotionis*, is MU IV.6. These are also the *śaikṣa* and *āśaikṣa* paths, of those who are and are no longer under the law. Those who attempt to take the latter before the first has been followed to its end are certain to lose their way.

⁵ Cf. TS VI.1.5.4, ŚB I.2.3.5 with Eggeling’s note (SBE, Vol. 12, p. 49) and ŚB III.3.4.21.

mortality: they made Bṛhaspati the sacrifice, Yama gave up (*arirecīt*,⁶ poured or emptied out) his own dear body” (RV x.13.4). [So in ŚB I.6.3.21, “Me (Soma) shall they offer up to all of you.” Prajāpati at his own sacrifice “gave himself up to the gods” (ŚB XI.1.8.2 ff.; the sacrificer “gives himself up to the gods, even as Prajāpati gave himself up to the gods . . . for the (Sacrifice) becomes an oblation to the gods”; cf. ŚB VIII.6.1.10.] And so it is “by the Sacrifice that the gods offered up the Sacrifice” (*yajñena yajñam ayajanta devaḥ*, RV x.90.16): we shall see presently why, and how correctly, Sāyaṇa says in commenting on the last passage that “the gods” are “Prajāpati’s breath-forms” (*prāṇarūpā*; see n. 56).

The sacrificer’s offering up of himself is ritually enacted in various ways. The *prastara*, for example, which represents the sacrificer, is thrown into the Fire, and he only saves himself from an actual immolation by an invocation of the Fire itself (ŚB I.9.2.17, cf. III.4.3.22): one who ritually approaches either the household or the sacrificial Fire does so reflecting that “that Fire knows that he has come to surrender himself to me” (*paridāṃ me*, ŚB II.4.1.11, cf. IX.2.1.17, IX.2.3.15, 17, IX.4.4.3, AB II.3), and if, indeed, “he did not expressly make this renunciation of himself (*ātmanah paridāṃ na vadeta*), the Fire would deprive him of it” (ŚB IX.5.1.53).⁷

Otherwise stated, “the Sacrificer casts himself in the form of seed⁸ (represented by grains of sand⁹) into the household Fire (*ātmanam . . . retobhūtaṃ siñcati*, ŚB VII.2.1.6) to ensure his rebirth here on earth, and

⁶ *√ric* is to “pour out” or “flood,” and with *ati-*, to “overflow,” the passive “to be emptied out over” having often the same value. A superabundance in the source and deficiency in the recipient are implied, hence *ūnātriktau* = minus and plus, *pudendum muliebre et membrum virile* (cf. Caland on PB XIX.3.9). To be “spent, or emptied out, as it were” (*ricāna iva*, PB IV.10.1 and *passim*) follows emission: only “as it were,” however, *in divinis*, because “the Single Season is never emptied out (*nātricyate*, AV VIII.9.26).” In RV x.90.5, the sacrificial Person “is poured out over, i.e., overflows the Earth from East to West” (*atyaricyata paścād bhūmim atho purāḥ*); cf. JUB I.54.7, *atyaricyata*, and I.57.5, *ubhayato vācā atyaricyata*.

⁷ *Qui enim voluerit animam suam salvam facere, perdet eam*, Mark 8:35.

⁸ Just as also, in being initiated, the sacrificer had been made to pass through all the stages of insemination, embryonic development in the womb, and birth; see AB I.3, where we have *sarctasam . . . kṛtvā* “having made him possessed of seed,” the seed from which he will arise as a new man (cf. Eckhart’s “He who sees *me*, sees *my child*”).

⁹ The Kuśāna coins, notably Kaniska’s, on which the king is shown standing left with his right hand over a small altar, are probably representations of this ritual action, and as much as to say that the king has performed the Rājasūya sacrifice and is, if not a god, in any case a ruler by divine sanction.

into the sacrificial altar with a view to his rebirth in heaven,¹⁰ employing verses containing the verb *āpyai*, "to grow,"¹¹ and referring to Soma, for "Soma being the Breath" (*prāṇaḥ*), he thus introduces Breath into the effused seed and so quickens it (ŚB VII.3.1.12, 45, 46); the verses (VS XII.1.12, 113) concluding "growing, O Soma, unto immortality, gain thou thy highest glory in the Sky," i.e., that of the Moon (ŚB III.4.3.13).

This introduces us to "Soma," of whom we shall have much to say. For he too, King Soma, is the victim: Agni the eater, Soma the food here below, the Sun the eater, the Moon his food and oblation above (ŚB XI.1.6.19, x.6.2.1-4, and *passim*). We cannot pursue this relationship here at full length except to say that "when eater and food (*adya* = *puroḍāśa*, sacrificial cake) unite (*ubhayaṃ samāgacchati*), it is called the eater, not the food" (ŚB x.6.2.1), i.e., there is an assimilation in both senses of the word; that this assimilation is also the marriage effected on the night before the new moon's rising (*amāvāsyā*, "cohabitation,"¹² *Pāṇini* III.1.122) when she enters into (*praviśati*) him (JUB 1.33.6); that the

¹⁰ Sexual intercourse, ritually understood, is a kind of Soma sacrifice (BU VI.2.13, VI.4.3). The household Fire is identified with the wife, of whom one is born again here; the sacrificial Fire is the divine womb into which one pours (*siñcati*) himself, and from which a solar rebirth ensues. The Comprehensor of this doctrine, making the Burnt Offering (*agnihotra*), has therefore two selves, two inheritances, human and divine; but one who offers, not understanding, has but one self, one inheritance, viz. the human (JUB 1.17.18). "That which is born of the flesh is flesh; and that which is born of the Spirit is spirit" (John 3:6). With the sowing of one self as seed into the Fire and the quickening of this seed by the Breath, cf. Rom. 6:4ff.: "We are buried with him [Christ] by baptism unto death . . . planted together . . . our old man is crucified with him, that the body of sin might be destroyed. For he that is 'dead' is freed from sin. Now if we be dead with Christ we believe that we shall also live with him."

¹¹ At the full moon offering there are references to the slaying of Vṛtra (the moon, ŚB 1.6.4.18), "because Indra smote Vṛtra with the full moon offering. In that they have references to waxing at the new moon offering, it is because then the moon passes away (*kṣapam* . . . *gacchati*) and verily thus does he cause it to grow and wax" (KB III.5).

¹² Sun and Moon, Breath and Substance, are a progenitive pair (Praśna Up. 1.4.5, cf. Plutarch, *Moralia* 368v). Their marriage is probably implied in RV LXXXV.18, 19 (cf. A. A. Macdonell and A. B. Keith, *Vedic Index of Names and Subjects*, London, 1912, s.v. *candra*), and by the word *amāvāsyā* itself. For comparative material cf. Ernest Siecke, *Die Liebesgeschichte des Himmels*, Strasbourg, 1892. Love and Death are one person. There are inseparable connections between initiation, marriage, and death, and alimentary assimilation; the word "marriage" itself seems to contain *mer* (Skr. *mṛ* to die, cf. *maryah*, marriageable youth); and very many of the words used in our texts with respect to the unification of the many in the one imply both death and marriage, e.g., *api-i*, *ekṣo bhū*, *sambhū*, *saṃgam*, *saṃdhā*; cf. *τελέω* to be perfected, be married, die.

Sun and Moon are the divine and human worlds, Om and Vāc (JUB III.13, 14), [i.e., Self and self, *le soi* and *le moi*]; and again, that the Sun is Indra, the Moon Vṛtra, whom he swallows on that night before the new moon appears (ŚB 1.6.4.18, 19). It appears, indeed, from a correlation of this passage with ŚB II.4.4.17-19, that Vṛtra is the solar Indra's bride—cf. RV x.85.29, where the Sun's bride, who enters into him (*viśati patim*), is originally ophidian, acquiring feet only on her marriage (as in the marriage of a mermaid to a human); and that there are more ways than one of "killing" a dragon. All this expresses the relationship of the Breath to the "elemental self," Eros to Psyche, the "Spirit" to the "soul," and is paralleled in Meister Eckhart's "The soul, in hot pursuit of God, becomes absorbed in Him . . . just as the sun will swallow up and put out the dawn" (Evans ed., I, 292; cf. Dante, *Paradiso* xxvii.136-138), who is herself a "snake" (*apād*) in the beginning (RV 1.152.3, VI.59.6).¹³

Into the details of the Soma Sacrifice (an indispensable part of the Agnihotra, oblation to Agni, burnt-offering), we need not enter here, except to remind ourselves that the shoots (*amśu*) of the Soma plant, or any plant that represents Soma and of which the stems or fruits are used, are "pressed" (*suta*)—i.e., crushed and ground—and that the strained and purified juice is offered in the Fire, and also partaken of by the priests and the sacrificer. There is a real analogy of the Soma mill to the wine-press, and of Soma juice to the "pure blood of the grape" (Deut. 32:14), and of the rite to the "drink offering" of the wine in the Fire (Lev. 23:13), *noster deus consumens* (Deut. 4:24), and of the slaying of Soma to the killing of the grain when it is threshed and ground. Ac-

¹³ Cf. Coomaraswamy, "Two Passages in Dante's *Paradiso*" and "The Rape of a Nāgi" [both in the present volumes—ED.].

[From another point of view, the coition (*samāgamana*) of the Sun (Mitra) and Moon (Varuṇa) on the night of their dwelling together (*amāvāsyā*), called a marriage of the full and waning moons, the (full) moon being identified with Varuṇa and the waning moon identified with Mitra (see ŚB II.4.4.17-19): precisely because the waning moon is assimilated by the Sun, and that which is eaten is called by the name of the eater (ŚB x.6.2.1, with specific reference to the Sun and Moon). This is the same thing as the solar Indra's swallowing up the lunar Vṛtra on "the night of dwelling together" (cf. KB III.5); Vṛtra is therefore to be seen as Indra's wife—"Potentiality hath gotten feet (i.e., shed her ophidian nature) and as a wife *jāyā* with her Lord" (RV x.85.29). In erotic parlance, to be "slain" and to be *in gloria* are one and the same thing. Now we see just what it is that the "hero" failed to do in the story of the Lady of the Land in The Earthly Paradise. And we see again that marriage is an assimilation of hostile principles, and that to be assimilated is to die. It is precisely in all these senses that the soul (which must as Eckhart says, "put itself to death") is to be thought of as the Bride of Christ. Can we wonder that Vincent of Beauvais spoke of Christ's *ferocitas*?]

cording to Plutarch (*Moralia* 353), the Egyptians thought of wine as "the blood of those who had once battled against the gods, and from whom when they had fallen and had been mingled with the earth, they believed vines to have sprung."

As to this last, "barley stalks are Soma stems" (ŚB XII.7.3.13); "barley is Varuṇa" (ŚB XIII.3.8.5),¹⁴ as was Soma tied up before his pressing (TS VI.1.11.2, 5); and brandy (*surā*, fermented liquor prepared from rice and barley) is one of the substances that can be made to be Soma by rites of transubstantiation (ŚB XII.7.3.11). The grains contain the sacrificial essence (*medha*) that had been in Man (*puruṣa*, cf. RV x.90), from which it passed to the horse, etc., and finally into the earth, whence it is regained by digging (cultivation). The grain is threshed, husked, winnowed, and ground. In the kneading and cooking the sacrificial cake (*puroḍasa*) acquires the animal qualities of hair, skin, flesh, bone, and marrow, and "the Man whom they had offered up becomes a mock-man" (*ḥimpuruṣa*).¹⁵ The cake becomes the sacrificial animal, and contains the sacrificial essence of the former animal victims. It can hardly be doubted that, like our "gingerbread men," the cake was made in the shape of a man.¹⁶ The whole procedure is expressly equated with the sacrifice of a living victim; the threshing and grinding are, like the slaying of Vṛtra

¹⁴ For the inauspiciousness of Varuṇa's uncultivated barley ("wild oats") cf. KB v.3 (those who eat of it are Varuṇa's prisoners); RV VII.18.5-10 (the *yavasa* of the unherded kine), and *per contra* the Aryan barley that the liberated kine enjoy, x.27.8.

The agricultural symbolism survives in our word "culture." The rocky ground of the soul must be opened up if it is to yield fruit; and this is a matter of spade-work and sweat. Cf. Philo, *Legum allegoriarum*, 1.48 (on Gen. 2:4, 5), Mind as the laborer in the field of sense perception.

¹⁵ Analogous to the mock man (*ḥimpuruṣa*, *anaddha-puruṣa*) made "in the place of a man" (Sāyaṇa, *puruṣasthāne*), and no doubt in human form, to represent the chthonic (*puriṣya*) Agni (ŚB VI.3.1.24, 3.3.4, 4.4.14) and "heaped up for to be the sacrificial essence, to be food" (*ciyamāna . . . medhāyety annāyati*, ŚB VII.5.2.32). The untamed soul is indeed a *ḥimpuruṣa*, a mockery of the real Man.

¹⁶ The shape of the sacrificial cake may depend on the context. In ŚB III.8.3.1, the *puroḍasa* is certainly a round cake, representing a man's head, or rather face, and the Sun's disk; seven other cakes, representing the "seven breaths" (ears, eyes, nostrils, and mouth) are arranged about it to complete it. As these "breaths" are also "glories" (*śriyah*), this is made the basis of the hermeneutic etymology of "head" (*śiras*). Cf. Philo, *De opificio mundi*, 129 (κεφαλή . . . ἐπτά χρεῖται, δυὶν ὀφθαλμοῖς, etc.) and 133 (πρόσωπον, ἐνθα τῶν αἰσθήσεων ὁ τόπος, etc.) cf. 151 (ἐν προσώπῳ τὰς αἰσθήσεις ἐδημύργει). Philo says that the divine power is infused "by means of the median breath" (διὰ τοῦ μέσου πνεύματος); this median breath is precisely the *madhyamāḥ prāṇaḥ* and *madhye vāmana* of the Āraṇyakas and Upaniṣads.

and Soma, sins requiring expiation; the flour that has been "killed" by the mortar and pestle and millstones is ritually quickened in order that the gods may be given the "living food"¹⁷ they require (ŚB I.1.4.6-1.2.3.9 and AB II.8, 9). ["Verily, living he goes to the gods" (TS v.6.6.4); cf. Rom. 12:1, "present your bodies a living sacrifice."] The traces of the passion of the "Vegetation Spirit" survive in popular¹⁸ agricultural rites all over the world, and notably in the words of the song "John Barleycorn," whose awns, like those of the rice in AB II.9, are his "beard," the mark of his manhood, and who, although they treat him so "barbarously," springs up again.

The polarity of Soma is like Agni's. The Soma when bought and tied up (in the form of a man, to represent the sacrificer himself, ŚB III.3.2.18) is of Varuṇa's nature, and must be made to be a Friend (Mitra) with the words, "Come unto us as the Friend (Mitra) creating firm friendships for pacification" (*śāntyai*, TS VI.1.11, 1.2.7).¹⁹ It must never be forgotten that "Soma was Vṛtra" (ŚB III.4.3.13, III.9.4.2, IV.4.3.4), and it needs no proof here that Vṛtra = Ahi, Pāpman, etc. Accordingly, "Even as Ahi from his inveterated skin, so [from the bruised shoots] streams the yellow rain, prancing like a horse" (RV IX.86.44), "even as Makha thou, Soma, goest prancing to the filter" (RV IX.20.7).²⁰ "The Sun, indeed, is Indra, and that Moon none but Vṛtra, and on the new-moon night he,

¹⁷ On the "living food" of the gods, cf. Coomaraswamy, "The Sun-kiss," 1941, p. 55, n. 26.

¹⁸ It may be noted that *lokyam* in AB II.9 is *not* "the people's" (Keith), but "conducive to the sacrificer's world," i.e., the "world" (*lokaḥ*) of ŚB x.5.2.12, x.5.4.16; KB VIII.3; BU I.4.15, 1.5.17; MU VI.24, etc., i.e., the world of the Self, world of the gods, Brahmāloka, heaven.

Popular agricultural rites are no more, generally speaking, of popular origin than are the narrative forms of folklore. It is a mistake to suppose that scripture ever makes use of "old folklore ideas pressed into its service" (Keith, AA, p. 251, n. 5). On the contrary, as Professor Mircea Eliade has very justly observed, "La mémoire collective conserve . . . des symboles archaïques d'essence purement métaphysique. . . La mémoire populaire conserve surtout les symboles qui se rapportent à des 'théories' même si ces théories ne sont plus comprises" ("Les Livres populaires dans la littérature roumaine," in *Zalmoxis*, II, 1939, p. 78). Cf. Coomaraswamy, "Primitive Mentality" [in Vol. I of this edition—ED.].

¹⁹ See Appendix 1.

²⁰ It is the general rule that the Ādityas have been originally Serpents, and have vanquished Death by the sloughing of their inveterated skins (PB xxv.14.4). Cf. the procession (*udāsarpaṇi*) of the *sarpasir mantrakṛtaḥ* . . . *āśviṣaḥ* Arbuda in AB VI.1; it is curious that just as Soma is strangled with a turban (*uṣṇiṣa*), ŚB III.2.18, so Arbuda (whose glance is baleful) is blindfolded with a turban in AB. On Soma's "prancing" or "playing" (*krīḍā*) cf. Coomaraswamy, "Lilā," 1941 [in this volume—ED.].

Indra, completely destroys him, leaving nothing remaining; when the Sun devours (*grasitvā*) him,²¹ he sucks him dry and spits him out (*taṃ nidhīrya nirasyati*); and having been sucked out (*dhītaḥ*), he grows again (*sa punar āpyāyate*); and whoever is a Comprehensor of this [myth or doctrine] in the same way overcomes all Evil (*pāpman*), leaving naught of it remaining" (ŚB 1.6.4.13, 19, 20; cf. TS 11.5.2.4, 5, JUB 1.33.6 [and *vrtram ahim . . . āvayat*, RV x.113.8]). The stone, in fact, with which Soma is pressed and slain, is identified with the Sun (Āditya Vivasvant, ŚB 11.9.4, 8), what is enacted here corresponding to what is done there. And as *in divinis* (*adhidevatam*) and in the ritual mimesis, so "within you" (*adhyātman*): the powers of the soul (sight, hearing, etc.) that are Brahma's immanent forms are called his "swallow" or "sink" (*giri*); and conversely the Comprehensor of this himself "swallows" or "sinks" (*girati*) the hateful, evil foe (*dviṣantam pāpmānam bhrātṛvyam* = *Vṛtra*),²² and "becomes with Self" (*bhavadaty ātmanā*), and like Brahma "one whose evil foe is as refuse" (*parāśya*, a thing to be cast out, spat out, rejected or refused, AĀ 11.1.8); the cycle is reversed and completed when in sleep (or in *samādhi* or at death) the Breath (*prāṇah*, immanent deity, Sun, Brahma) itself "swallows up" (*jagāra*) the "four great selves,"²³ viz. these same powers of sight, hearing etc. (JUB 111.2).

So also in terms of the animal sacrifice offered to Agniṣomau, who, when they have been united, jointly "overcome the Sacrificer," who is born in debt to Death (ŚB 111.6.2.16) and is only redeemed by the actual victim, "or rather [i.e., more truly], they say: 'Unto Agniṣomau Indra

²¹ As Bṛhaspati "eats" (*ādat*) Vala, RV x.68.6. Cf. n. 72.

²² When Indra casts his bolt "at the evil hateful foe" (*pāpmane dviṣate bhrātṛvyāya*), it is "Vṛtra the Evil One" (*vrtram pāpmānam*) that he smites (ŚB 11.3.3.5): "brotherhood" expressing "enemy" because the Asuras are the "elder brothers" of the Devas (*jyeṣṭha*, "elder," from √ *jya*, to "oppress." We have argued elsewhere (*Spiritual Authority and Temporal Power in the Indian Theory of Government*, 1942, n. 22) that throughout the sacrificial texts the "Enemy" is primarily Vṛtra, Pāpman, Mṛtyu (Buddhist Māra, Pāpivant), and that any application of the formulae to other and human enemies is always secondary; that it is only when the King has overcome his own Devil that he is empowered to overcome other devilish rebels. Keith is clearly right in saying that a magical application of the rites is foreign to the *Rg Veda*, but as certainly wrong in saying that "the sacrifice in the Brāhmaṇas is a piece of magic pure and simple" (*Religion and Philosophy of the Veda and Upanishads*, London, 1925, p. 454).

²³ The breaths or powers of the soul are so many "selves" or "persons" (the seeing man, the hearing man, etc.), but act unanimously as the man himself, for or against his real Self, the Breath, their Head and Leader (AĀ 11.3.5, 6, 111.2.1; JUB 11.7.4; CU 111.12.4 ff.; Kaus. Up. 111.2, 8, 11.20), source and last end.

slew Vṛtra" (TS 11.1.11.5;²⁴ similarly ŚB 111.3.4.21). Thus "ransoming Self by self" (KB 111.3),²⁵ "by self he enters into Self" (VS 111.11.11). The like holds good in terms of the supplementary sacrifice of the Cake (*puroḍāsa*), which contains the sacrificial property (*medha*) that was originally in the human victim (ŚB 1.1.4.8, 9, 111.8.3.1-3).

Or rather, it is not Soma himself, but only his evil (*pāpman*) that is slain (ŚB 111.9.4.17, 18).²⁶ For "Soma is the Regnum" (*ḥsatra*, ŚB 11.3.5.8); and it is precisely that he may be enthroned, and rule indeed, that he is "slain" (ŚB 111.3.2.6). The guilt from which Soma is cleansed is that he oppressed Bṛhaspati, his Purohita, or that he was even capable of thinking of such a thing (ŚB 11.1.2.4); his passion is an assimilation to and a marital reunion with the Sacerdotum. The whole pattern underlies and is reflected in the rites of royal initiation (*rājasūya* = *varuṇa-sava*)—"This man is your king, Soma the king of us Brāhmans" (VS x.18). The prince dies that the king may be born of him; there remains no evil, nothing of his Varuṇya nature in the king; it is not himself but his evil that is killed. The beating with sticks (ŚB 11.4.4.7) may be compared to the pressing of Soma and to the threshing of grain by which it is separated from the husks. As Indra slew Vṛtra, so the king overcomes his own hateful, evil foe (ŚB 11.2.3.7).

In the beginning, Indra overcomes Vṛtra for the sake of Agni and Soma, whom he has swallowed; in the Sacrifice Agni and Soma overcome

²⁴ Not as Keith renders it (against the Commentary) "by Agni and Soma," but for them because they are in Vṛtra, from whom they can escape only when Indra makes him yawn (TS 11.5.2.3, 4), only when "Indra forced the Engulfer to disgorge, compelled the panting Dānava" (*jigartim indro apajagurānah prati śvasantam dānavam han*, RV 1.29.4; cf. 111.2.1.11, *śvasantam*, and note √ *śvas*, *śus*, in "Śuṣṇa"). Vṛtra is the Sacrifice; it is in the same way that Indra and Agni are brought forth from the Person, the Sacrifice, in RV x.90.13, and that "as from a fire laid with damp fuel . . . so from this great being (*bhūta*, viz. *ātman*) were the Vedas, worlds and all things breathed forth" (*nīśvasitam*, BU 11.5.11, MU 11.32; cf. JUB 1.47.3, "The All, that is his breathing forth"). Beyond all question the "Great Being" from whom all these things are breathed out is the Vṛtra from whose mouth (when Indra made him yawn) "went forth all gods, all sciences, all glory, all food, all weal," leaving him drained (ŚB 1.6.3.15.16); just as Śeṣa (*yad aśiṣyata*, see Appendix 2) = *Ātman*, so here also *Ātman*, Mahābhūta = Vṛtra. For just as "Him being One they call by many names" (RV 1.164.46, etc.), so the one Urmythos (*bhāvavṛtta*, Genesis) has been told and retold in many ways, and that not only in India, but all over the world where "in den verschiedenen Kulturen findet man die Dialekte der einen Geistesprache" (Alfred Jeremias, *Altorientalische Geisteskultur*, Berlin, 1929, foreword).

²⁵ Cf. Lev. 1:4.

²⁶ "That the body of sin might be destroyed," Rom. 6:6.

the sacrificer, or rather what in him is of Vṛtra's nature, and so the circle is completed. Thus: Tvaṣṭṛ cast the residue (*yad aśiṣyata*)²⁷ of the Soma upon his sacrificial Fire, saying, "Wax great as Indra's foe." Then, "whether it was what was falling (*pravaṇam*, lit. 'on the slope')²⁸ or what was on the Fire (*adhy agneḥ*), that coming into being (*sa sambhavan*, i.e., as Vṛtra) overcame (*abhisambhavat*) Agni and Soma," and then Vṛtra "waxed" and, as his name implies, "enveloped (*avṛnot*)" these worlds (TS II.4.12, cf. II.5.2). Whereas in the Sacrifice "they bring forward the Soma (juice), and when he is established in Agni [the *regnum* in the *sacerdotum*], they coexisting (*sambhavantau*) overcome (*abhisambhavataḥ*) the sacrificer²⁹ [represented by the victim, TS VI.6.9.2, etc.]. Now the initiate (*dikṣitaḥ*) has been hitherto holding himself in readiness to serve as the sacrificial essence; but (*eva*) in that Agni and Soma receive a victim, that is his redemption. . . . Or, rather [i.e., more truly] they say: 'Indra smote Vṛtra for Agni and Soma.' Inasmuch as the sacrificer offers up a victim to Agni and Soma, it verily becomes 'his Vṛtra-slayer' " (*vātraghna evāśya sa*, TS VI.1.11.6). The Comprehensor who offers the full and new moon offering does so *with* Indra (TS II.5.4.1); as Indra repelled Vṛtra, the Evil One, by the new moon offering, so does the sacrificer (ŚB VI.2.2.19). "Agni, the Lord of the operation, makes him who has slain his Vṛtra to operate [sacrifice] for a year; thereafter he may sacrifice at will" (TS II.5.4.5). "At will," for when the purpose of the Sacrifice has been accomplished, there is nothing more that

²⁷ *Yad aśiṣyata* = *śeṣa*, see Appendix 2.

²⁸ Cf. RV IX.17.1, *pra nimnena*, Sāyaṇa *pravanena*.

²⁹ "The initiate enters the jaws of Agniṣomau; in that on the fast day he offers a victim to them, this is a redemption of himself" (KB x.3). Similarly, ŚB III.3.4.21 and III.6.3.19, where "the initiated is the oblation offered to the gods" (*haviṣ vāṣa devānām bhavati*), i.e., their food, and must redeem himself from Soma, that is to say from Varuṇa's noose (*ibid.*, 20) or curse (III.3.2.2), for Soma was Varuṇa—in other words, from the jaws of Death into which the sacrificer would be swallowed up at every stage of the sacrifice if he did not in one way or another redeem himself. The Soma sacrifice is a "mysterious rite" (*gambhīram adhvaram*, ŚB III.9.4.5 *adhvara*, lit. "not-a-slaving," "no doubt referring to the nature of the sacrifice, in which the victim is slain but revived, and the sacrificer would die were he not redeemed). "Such, indeed, are the forests and ravines of the sacrifice (*yajñānānyāni yajña-kṣatrāṇi* [? for *khātṛāṇi*]) . . . and if any enter into them ignorantly, then hunger and thirst, ill-doers and devils harass them . . . but if Comprehensors enter into them, they pass on from one task to another, as from one stream to another, from one refuge to another, and obtain well-being, the world of heaven" (ŚB XII.2.3.12); "dangerous are the ways between heaven and earth" (ŚB II.3.4.37); "the sacrifice is razor-edged, and swiftly he (who sacrifices) becometh holy or he perishes" (*pūṇyo vā bhavati pra vā miyate*, TS II.5.5.6).

must be done; such an one is now a *kāmācārin*, he is no longer under the law but delivered from the law of obedience to that of liberty, and to him it can be safely said, *Lo mai piacere omai prende per duce*. The Buddha no longer makes burnt offering (as he had done in former states of being), he does what he likes (*kāmakāro*, Sn 350) just because he has overcome and dispossessed *his* Vṛtra.

The word *giri* (AĀ II.1.8), rendered above by "swallow" (n.), lends itself to a far-reaching exegesis. Keith translates it by "hiding place" (of Brahma), and in a note says very rightly that "it is called *giri*, because *prāṇa* is swallowed up and hidden by the other senses."³⁰ In a note on AĀ II.2.1, he adds, "The sun and *prāṇa* are as usual identified, the one being the *adhidaivatam*, the other the *adhyātman* representation. The former attracts the vision, the latter impels the body."³¹ It is, in fact, within us that the deity is "hidden" (*guhā nihitam, passim*), there that the Vedic *ṛṣayaḥ* sought him by his tracks, there in the heart that the "hidden Sun" (*sūryaṃ guḥam*, RV V.40.6, etc.) is to be "found." "For this in ourself is hidden (*guhādhyaṁmam*), these deities (the breaths); but manifest *in divinis*" (*āvīr adhidaivatam*, AĀ I.3.3), speech being "manifest" as Agni, vision as the Sun, etc. (AĀ II.1.5, etc.). These are the "two forms of Brahma, the formed (*mūrta*, i.e., visible) and the unformed (*amūrta*) . . . presented (*sat*) and immanent (*tya*),"³² respectively the visible Sun disk and the eye, and the unseen Persons in the disk and in the eye (BU II.3).

³⁰ The "other senses" (sight, hearing, etc.) identified with the *giri* of Brahma are extensions or sendings (*prahitāḥ*, AĀ II.1.5 = *hitāḥ*, Upaniṣads *passim*, *guhāśa-yā nihitāḥ* in Muṇḍ. Up. II.1.8, *prativihitāḥ* in Kauṣ. Up. III.5, and as the *istāni* of the Ṛṣis are *vihitāni*, RV I.164.15, and the Maruts *hitāḥ* in I.166.3) of the central Breath (*prāṇaḥ*) or Spirit (*ātman*) from which they originate and to which they return. Hence his name of "Gṛtsamada": *gṛtsa*, "greedy," because as *prāṇaḥ* he breathes in, and as *madaḥ*, "pleasure," he breathes out these powers (AĀ II.2.1). That is, God is swallowed up in us when he proceeds, and we in him when he recedes.

³¹ "The Sun's body is seen by everyone, its soul by no one. And the same is true of the soul of any other body . . . embracing all the senses of the body, but only knowable by the mind. . . . Soul (as charioteer) drives the Sun about . . . (and) moves us about in all ways," Plato, *Laws* 898b–899a; cf. AV x.8.14, "Him all see with the eye, not all know with the mind"; and for the "chariot" (bodily vehicle), MU II.6, etc.

³² *Tya* is not "yonder" (Hume); it is the manifested God, the visible Sun that is "yonder"; *tya*, as the following verses show, refers to the transcendent principle that is invisibly in the Sun and within you. Cf. *tyasya* = *mama* in BU I.3.24.

With *giri* (✓ *gir*, "swallow") compare *grha* (✓ *grah*, "grasp"); both imply enclosures, resorts, a being within something. At the same time, *giri* is "mountain"; and *garta* (from the same root) both "seat" and "grave" (one can be "swallowed up" in either). The semantics is paralleled in Ger. *Berg*, "mountain," and its cognates Eng. *barrow*, (1) "hill" and (2) "burial mound," *burgh*, "town," *borough*, and finally *bury*; cf. Skr. *stūpa*, (1) "top," "height," and (2) burial mound. We are then, the "mountain" in which God is "buried," just as a church or a *stūpa*, and the world itself, are His tomb and the "cave"³³ into which He descends for our awakening (MU 11.6, *pratibodhanāya*; cf. AV 11.4.15,

³³ Cf. Plato's "cave," and the "cavernous" quality of early traditional architecture, floor, space, and roof corresponding to earth, air, and sky equally in a cavern and in a chamber; cf. *guhā*, "cave," "hiding place," and "hut." Brahma is indeed *guhyam* (KU v.6), the spirit *nihito guhāyam* (KU 11.20), "hidden" in us, as a "cave-dweller."

That God is "buried" in us underlies the Vedic metaphor of digging for hidden treasure, and that of mining in MU 11.29. The powers of the soul (τῆς ψυχῆς δυνάμεις, which Hermes calls δαίμονες, *Lib.* xvi.14 ff.) are "elementals" (*bhūtāḥ*), and their concern is with the "elements" (*bhūtānti*) or "ores" (*dhātavaḥ*). *Bhūtāḥ*, "beings," are likewise elves, sprites (spirits), fairies, or dwarfs, who may be either good or evil; it is not without reason that these beings, the Sidhe for example, are so often thought of as living in "fairy mounds"—or when the "little people" are thought of as dwarfs or gnomes, then in mountains. The head and leader of these psychic *Bergleute*, thought of as dwarfs, is himself the immanent Dwarf, Vāmadeva, Vāmana, the "Dwarf enthroned in the midst whom all the gods serve (*madhye vāmanam āsinam viśve devā upāsate*, KU v.3); the "gods," in accordance with Śaṅkara's inevitable explanation, being the powers of the soul ("vision, etc.," i.e., the "breaths"), bringing tribute (*balim upaharantāḥ*) to their head, the "Other One" of verse 5, who is beyond all question the median "Breath," as is explicit in AĀ 11.2.1. Thus the dwarfs and gnomes of the European tradition, digging for treasure in the mountains, are the projected images and trace in folklore of our own elemental powers. In one of our best known *Märchen*, the formulation is very precise: it is the natural function of the "seven dwarfs" to serve and protect Snow White, who is herself Psyche; Snow White is poisoned by the "fruit of the tree," and that this is the tree of good and evil is clear from the fact that the apple is parti-poisonous and parti-wholesome (the fruit of the tree is wholesome for those who eat to live, but deadly for those who live to eat; cf. SB 11.4.2.1–6). Of themselves the dwarfs can protect but cannot heal her; this is done by the solar hero, a "Prince Charming" (i.e., in the full sense of the word, "enchanting": the solar Hero is the master of enchantment—blessed are those whom this magician enchants), and it is only when the tasted apple falls from her lips that she awakens from her deadly sleep.

In an alternative symbolism, the cave becomes a laboratory and the workers alchemists seeking for the philosopher's stone; or a smithy in which ores are refined and beaten into shape—"as a goldsmith taking a piece of gold draws out of it (*tanute*, ✓ *tan*, also to sacrifice and to propagate) another, newer and fairer form, so the Spirit . . ." (BU 11.4.4).

jinvasyatha). What all this leads to, bearing in mind that both the Maruts and Soma shoots are equated with the "breaths" (SB 11.3.1.7, AB 11.16, and TS 11.4.4.4), is the probability that *giri* in the *R̥g Veda*, although translatable by "mountain," is really rather "cave" (*guhā*) than "mountain," and *giriṣṭha* "in the mountain" rather than upon it, and tantamount to *ātmastha* (KU v.12, MU 11.2), notably in RV 11.94.12, where the Marut host is *giriṣṭha*, and 11.85.12 and v.43.4 where Soma and Soma juice (*rasa*) are *giriṣṭha*. Just the same is implied in RV v.85.2, where Varuṇa is said to have put "Counsel in hearts, Agni in the waters, the Sun in the sky, and Soma in the rock" (*adrau*, *Sāyana parvate*).³⁴ "The

³⁴ In this context *adrau* is, like the other words *hṛtsu*, etc., a locative of place *in*: in TS 11.1.11, where the text is cited, Keith renders rightly "in the hill." In the same way Soma is "shut up in the rock" (*āsnāpinaddham*, RV x.68.8); and in JUB 11.5.2, *āsnasu somo rājā* is rendered rightly by Oertel "in the stones King Soma." In SB 11.4.3.13 and 11.9.4.2, we are reminded that "Soma was Vṛtra" (= Ahi, described in RV 1.32.2 as "having his lair in the mountain," *parvate iśrayānam*, i.e., in a cave; one recalls that dragons always live in caves, and not on mountaintops), and we are told that "Soma's body ('body' is that *in* which the subject lives) was the mountains and the rocks (*tasyaitaccharīram yad giriyo yad āsmānas*), thence is born that plant called 'Uśānā' (*tad eśośānā nāmauśad hir jāyate*), . . . which they collect thence and press" (*tām etad āhṛtyābhiṣunvanti*). We naturally think of plants as growing on mountains, and so they do; but things are born from what contained them, plants are *in* the earth before they spring up. Sāyana's commentary, moreover, makes it clear that by "mountains" are to be understood "beings" (*soma-śarīra-bhūteṣu . . . atas tām eva girāv utpannām . . . abhiṣunvanti*), i.e., the Soma = *bhūtātman*, as in MU 11.10, cited below; and that the plant that is actually collected is "not really Soma" (*na sākṣāt somam*), but only ritually made to be Soma. Thus Vṛtra (= Vala) is the rock that Indra smites and from which Indra (or Brhaspati or both) releases cattle, streams, and all those things that had been covered up and hidden away (*vṛtam* = *verbergt*, *verhüllt*, "hilled") in the beginning.

Not only then is *giri* (mountain) to be connected with *gir* to "swallow" (not *gir* to "sing"), but there can be no doubt that Indian hermeneutists connected *āśman* (and doubtless *āsna*) with *ās*, to "eat"; e.g., Mahidhara glosses VS 17.1.1 *āśman* by *āśnātīty*, *āsma*; he *āśman*, *sarvabhakṣaṣa agne*. In AV 17.1.4.54 *āśmānānam adhipatyam jiyāma*, Whitney renders *āśman* by "stone" but Böhtlingk and Roth by "Esser." The hermeneutist might in the same way derive *adri* from *ad*, to "eat." I by no means assert that all these hermeneia are etymologically valid; what they nevertheless point to is that early man (the troglodyte) thought of a mountain as a place to live not *on*, but *in*, and as a depository of treasure—a manner of thinking that survives in the concept of the "house" which is not that of a solid mass but that of a "dome" (*dama*) in which things are housed and hidden, and in which, indeed, the owner himself is "swallowed" up when he enters its doorway (*mukham* = *ostium*), disappearing when he "goes home" (*astam gacchati*) and reappearing when he comes out of doors (*prādur bhavati*). We are such "houses."

Soma oblation . . . is incorporeal" (AB II.14). No wonder that "of him the Brāhmins understand by 'Soma' none ever tastes, none tastes who dwells on earth" (RV x.85.3, 4).

Soma's death is his procession; he is slain in the same sense that every initiate, *homo moriturus*, dies, to be born again. "A man is unborn insofar as he does not sacrifice" (JUB III.14.8), to sacrifice is to be born (KB xv.3), Vṛtra's slaughter is Indra's birth (as Mahendra, ŚB I.6.4.21). The Sacrificer, participating in Soma's passion, is born again of the sacrificial Fire in the sense that "except a man be born again . . ." and "Except a corn of wheat fall into the ground and die . . ." (John 3:3 and 12:24).

We observed that Yama "gave up," or much more literally, "emptied out" (*arirecit*) his body. In the same way the Person, the One whom the gods make manifold, is said to have been poured out completely, or have been "all emptied out" (*aty aricyata*, RV x.90.5, Sāyaṇa *atirikto'bhūt*); it is often stated that Prajāpati, desiring to be many, and emanating offspring (*prajā sṛṣtvā*), was emptied out (*iricānah*, ŚB III.9.1.2, and *pasim*). In the same way, Vṛtra, in whom the streams had been covered up (RV VII.100.7), and from whom Indra and Viṣṇu win "that by which he is these worlds" (TS II.4.12), is like a leather bottle "drained" (*niṣpī-tah*)³⁵ of his contents (ŚB I.6.3.16); just as, conversely, in "sleep" these same powers are "drunk in" (*āpitā bhavanti*) by the Breath (ŚB x.5.2.14-15). That all This (Universe) was in Vṛtra is the very *raison d'être* of the Sacrifice (ŚB v.5.5.1).

All this is reflected in the ritual, as if in a mirror, inversely. Whereas Prajāpati divides himself, pours out his offspring, makes himself many and enters into us in whom he is swallowed up and hidden, so in his turn the sacrificer "draws in" (*uddhṛtya*, √ *hr*) these breaths with Om, and sacrifices them in the Fire without evil" (MU VI.26). As Prajāpati "emanated offspring, and thought himself emptied out" (*iricāno'manyata*), so "the sacrificer as it were emanates offspring and is thereupon emptied out as it were" (*iricāna iva*, TS VI.6.5.1): "With his whole mind, his whole self (*sarveṇevātmanā*), indeed, the initiate (*dīkṣitaḥ*) assembles

³⁵ As the powers of the soul are "drunk in" (*āpitāḥ*) in ŚB x.5.2.12, when they "enter into" (*apiyanti*, Kauṣ. Up. III.3, etc.) the Breath in "sleep," in *samādhi*, or at death.

The roots *api* (go in to), *āpi* (drink in), *āp* (possess), *āpyai* (swell) must be very carefully distinguished in all texts having to do with the procession and recession of the powers of the soul; in AV x.8.5, Whitney's Index is certainly wrong in reading *āpitvam*, Lanmann right in reading *apitvam*.

(*sambharati*) and would collect (*saṃ ca jīhṛṣati*, √ *hr*) the Sacrifice; his self, as it were, is emptied out" (*iricāna ivātmā bhavati*, ŚB III.8.1.2, KB x.3). That the sacrificer thus "collects" (*samharati*, √ *hr*) himself is the active equivalent on his part of what is done to him by the Spiritual Self itself at death (or in sleep, or in *samādhi*) "when the breaths (*prāṇāḥ*, i.e., *indriyāni*, τῆς ψυχῆς δυνάμεις) unite with it (*abhisamāyanti*) and it, taking complete possession of those measures of fire"³⁶ (*etā tejo-mātrāḥ samabhyādādāno*) descends into the heart (*hṛdayam evānuvākṛāmati*)³⁷ . . . (and thus) striking down the body, dispelling its ignorance, collects itself (*ātmānam samharati*) in order to pass on" (BU IV.4.1, 3);³⁸ the equivalent on his part of what is done by the departing Breath (*prāṇāḥ*) when it "extracts" (*samurh*, BU VI.1.13) or "impresses" (*saṃkṣhid*, CU V.1.2, i.e., "levies") the breaths, as a horse might tear out the pegs by which it is tethered.

This takes place in any case when "the dust returns to the dust as it was: and the spirit unto God who gave it" (Eccl. 12:7).³⁹ The burning question for us is, "In whom, when I go forth, shall I be going forth? On whose ground shall I be standing?" (Pśna Up. VI.3).⁴⁰ Shall I *be collected* or shall I *collect myself*? Shall I be passively repossessed or actively self-possessed? "Whoever departs from this world, not having seen his very own world (*svam lokam adṛṣtvā*),⁴¹ he unaware of it no more

³⁶ The breaths or "sense powers" are "fires." Cf. Coomaraswamy, "Measures of Fire" [in this volume—ED.].

³⁷ As in ŚB x.5.2, where the *ἑρὸς γάμος* of Indra and Indrāṇī is consummated in the heart. Indrāṇī (Psyche) is the sum of the *indriyāni*, as Śaci is the person of Indra's *śaciḥ*, Śrī the person of many *śriyaḥ*, and in Buddhist contexts Sudhamā = *sudhammā*, cf. Victoria, properly n. pl. of *victor*, but as a person f.

³⁸ In this whole context (BU IV.4.1-7), it is especially important to bear in mind that He who is the only seer, only hearer, only thinker, only comprehensor in us (BU III.7.23), He who wanders from womb to womb (AV x.8.13), the charioteer who sets us agoing (MU II.6, etc.), is by the same token the only transmigrant; as Śankara puts it, "Of a truth, the Lord is the only transmigrant" (*satyam, neśvarād anyah saṃsārin*, BrSBh I.1.5). Neither in the Brahmanical nor in the Pāli Buddhist texts can any doctrine of the "reincarnation" of an individual be found, except in the sense that a man is reborn in his children.

³⁹ "The spirit (*akḥ*) is for heaven, the body (*khet*) for the earth" (K. H. Sethe, "Saqqarah Pyramid Texts," in Margaret A. Murray, *Saqqara Mastabas*, London, 1905, 474): to become this *akḥ*, or *ka*, at death, is to become a God, an Immortal (A. Moret, *The Nile and Egyptian Civilization*, London, 1927, pp. 169, 182, 183).

⁴⁰ Cf. the answers in CU III.14.4, Kauṣ. Up. II.14, and Pśna Up. IV.7, and cf. AV x.8.44. The resurrection is the "birth out of doubt" of ŚB II.2.4.9, and accordingly to faith, JUB III.11.7.

⁴¹ See n. 18, first paragraph.

profits than one might from the Vedas unrecited or a deed undone" (BU 1.4.15); whereas, "One who knows that contemplative, ageless, youthful Self has nothing to fear from death" (AV x.8.44).

The relationship of the breaths to the Breath, like that of the Maruts (identified with the breaths in ŚB ix.3.1.7, etc.), is that of subjects (*viśah, svāh*) to their king or duke. They are, accordingly, his legitimate "food," he lives *on* them. They are, in fact, his "divisions." As he (Bhagavan), distributing his powers, divides himself (*ātmānam vibhajya, passim*) in them, so are they his devoted supporters (*bhaktāh*) in that it is theirs to "support" him, in every sense of the word, but especially inasmuch as it is theirs to render him his "share" (*bhāgam*). This feudal relationship is repeatedly stated in the words "We are thine and thou art ours" (RV viii.92.32, BU iv.4.37, etc.; cf. Plato, *Laws* 904B). That they "feed" him is constantly stated in the phrase, "they bring him tribute" (*balim haranti* or *bharanti*).⁴² In BU vi.1.3, when the superiority of the Breath has been acknowledged, he, addressing the breaths, says, "In that case, pay me tribute" (*me balim kuruta*); each, accordingly, makes acknowledgment that its particular function is not its own, but his; in the case of speech (*vāc*), for example, "That wherein I am the 'worthiest' (f.) (*yad vā aham vasiṣṭhāsmi*), that 'worthiest' (m.) art thou" (*tvam tad vasiṣṭho'si*).⁴³ They,

⁴² AV x.7.39, *yasmai devāḥ sadā balim haranti*; x.8.15, *mahadyakṣam* (Brahma) . . . *tasmai balim rāstrabhṛto bharanti*; xi.4.19, *prajā imā balim harān*; Kauṣ. Up. 11.1, *ayācamānāya* (without his asking) *balim haranti*; JUB iv.23.7, *balim hareyuh*; MU vi.18, *pratyāhāra* (= later *devāhāra, amṛta*), as in BG 11.58, *yadā samharati indriyānindriyārthebhyah*.

In the same way, ritually, *balī* offerings are made at Yakṣa shrines, and politically subjects offer tribute.

If the king "plunders" his subjects' cattle (*pecunia*!) it is because what seems to be theirs is really his; just as God plunders us, all of whose great possessions are borrowed from Him (PB xxi.1.1). Therefore "Render unto Caesar the things that are Caesar's and unto God the things that are God's." It is for Caesar as for God to redistribute the "food." The reciprocal relations of the powers of the soul to the Spirit in the individual microcosm and the circulation of money (*pecunia*!) in the political microcosm correspond to that of the "shower of wealth" (*vasor dharā*) in the macrocosm. It is not by demanding tribute and service, but by failing to expend his revenues for his people's good, that a king becomes ungodly, a Vṛtra rather than an Indra.

⁴³ Vasiṣṭha, the primal Brahman of RV vii.33.11, is regularly Agni; who "abides in beings as speech (*vāc*) in the speaker" (AV 11.1.4) and is *in divinis* what speech is in us, just as the Sun is *in divinis* what the power of vision is in us (*passim*). Hence she is Vasiṣṭhā to him as Vasiṣṭha. These traditional correspondences underlie the connection between the tongues of fire and the speaking with tongues in Acts 2:3; see Coomaraswamy, "*Lilā*" [in this volume—ED.].

in other words, *contribute* offerings to him that are in reality his *attributes* (*ābharāṇa*); they acknowledge that they are "only the names of his acts" (BU 1.4.7, cf. 1.5.21, 1.6.3; BG iii.15, etc.).

In TS 11.4.12.5, 6 and ŚB 1.6.3.17, Vṛtra enters into Indra by agreement. The fire is, indeed, the consumer of food both for gods and men (JUB iv.11.5-7). Or rather, that part of the bisected Vṛtra which was of Soma's nature becomes the Moon, and that part of him which was Asurya (i.e., the ophidian part, the tail) became the belly, "to kindle (*indhīya*) him" and "for his enjoyment (*bhogāya*)," and is in men the tyrannical appetite to which these creatures (*imāḥ prajāḥ*, sc. *prāṇāḥ*, sensitive powers of which the individual is a host) pay tribute (*balim haranti*) whenever they are hungry. So men say that "Vṛtra is within us"; and the Comprehensor of this doctrine, that Vṛtra is the consumer, slays man's enemy, privation or hunger. As to this, one recalls on the one hand that the bowels are of a serpentine aspect and, as it were, headless; and on the other that for Plato, and traditionally, the bowels are the seat of the emotions and appetites.⁴⁴ We must, of course, beware of understanding "food" in any restricted sense; in all our texts, "food" is whatever can be desired, whatever nourishes our existence, whatever feeds the fires of life; there are foods for the eye and foods for the mind, and so forth. Vṛtra's fire is the source of our *voluptas* when we seek in works of art nothing but an "aesthetic" experience, and of our *turpis curiositas* when we "thirst for knowledge" for its own sake. Of the "two birds," one eats, the other oversees but does not eat (RV 1.164.20, Muṇḍ. Up. iii.1.1, etc.).

Hence, in the significant verses of MU vi.34, "As fire deprived of fuel (*nirindhaḥ*)⁴⁵ is extinguished in its own hearth (*svayonāv upasāmyate*), so when its emotions⁴⁶ have been killed (*vṛtti-kṣayāt*) the will is extinguished in its own seat (*cittam svayonāv upasāmyate*). It is from the love of Truth (*satyakāmatas*) that the mind (*manas*) is extinguished in its own seat; false are the actions and the wantings that haunt (*karma-vaśānugāḥ*) one bemused by the objects of the sensitive powers (*indriyārtha-vimūḍhasya*). Transmigration (*samsāra*) is nothing but our willing

⁴⁴ Hence the necessity for a purgation, katharsis, *śuddha kārana*, of the mind (*manas, kṛatu, voûs*) in order to eliminate these waste products.

⁴⁵ To have extinguished the fire of life by withholding its fuel becomes a common Buddhist metaphor. In this broader sense, fasting and continence mean far more than mere abstention from concrete foods or sexual acts.

⁴⁶ For *citta-vṛtti* I believe that "emotions" is a more accurate rendering than is Woods' "fluctuations." Note that *vṛtti* assimilates the *śuddham kāmāsaṃpārkaṃ manas* (MU vi.34) to the Vṛtra of ŚB 1.6.3.9, so called because he was "on the move" (*avartayat*).

(*cittam eva*); purge it (*śodhayet*) carefully, for 'As is one's willing, so one comes to be' (*yac cittas tanmayo bhavati*).⁴⁷ . . . The mind is said to be twofold, clean and unclean (*śuddham cāśuddham eva*); unclean by connection with wanting (*kāma*), clean when dis severed from wanting. . . . "The mind, indeed, is for human beings (*manuṣyānām*) the means alike of bondage and of freedom, of bondage, when attached to objects (*viśaya*), and of release (*mokṣa*) when detached therefrom." And "Hence, for those who do not perform the Agnihotra (do not make burnt-offering), who do not edify the Fire, who do not know and do not contemplate, the recollection of Brahma's empyrean abode is obstructed. So the Fire is to be served with offerings, to be edified, lauded, and contemplated."⁴⁸

⁴⁷ Cf. AĀ II.1.3, *karma kṛtam ayam puruṣo brahmaṇo, lokah*, "this Person is what he does, he is the Brahma-world"; BU IV.4.5, *yathākārī yathā cārī tathā bhavati . . . sa yathākāmo bhavati . . . tad abhisampadyate*, "As he (this Person) acts, as he conducts himself, so he becomes; what he wants . . . that he attains"; Plato, *Laws* 904c, "Such as are the trend of our desires and the nature of our souls, just such each of us becomes"; and similarly for Hermes, whose δαίμονες are the innate tendencies or powers and the nature or "fate" of the soul, "the being of a daimon consists in his working" (δαίμονος γὰρ οὐσία ἐνέργεια, *Lib.* XVI.14); a man cannot be and yet be doing nothing, God himself is what he does (*Lib.* XI.2.12b, 13a). At the same time, the act of being is one of self-knowledge (BU I.4.10); and so "to know and to be are the same" (τὸ γὰρ αὐτὸ νοεῖν ἐστίν τε καὶ εἶναι, Hermann Diels, *Fragmente der Vorsokratiker*, Berlin, 1903, 18B5).

⁴⁸ Cf. Muṇḍ. Up. I.2.3. The supposed opposition of the Upaniṣads to the observance of rites is largely a figment of the imagination; and similarly in Buddhism, where the Buddha says that so long as the Vajjians observe their ancient customs "and honor (*sakkaronti*, lit. 'verify'), esteem (*garuḥkaronti*, lit. 'treat as weighty'), respect (*mānenti*) and serve (*pūjenti*) the Vajjian (Yakkha-) shrines within or without the city, and do not withhold the tribute (*bulim no parihāpentī*) formerly given and duly rendered, . . . so long may they be expected not to decline, but to prosper" (D II.75).

It is only for those already liberated and already in a "state of grace" that observances are unnecessary, though they may still remain convenient. What is always necessary to liberation is to understand and be fully aware of what one is doing.

"All rites are *rites de passage*. . . . Rite opens the portals through which none may pass but the dead. . . . At each of the crises which usher in the successive phases of great lives, the vital tide rises and falls, first at its ebb in the mystical (*sic*) state of ritual death, then at the moment of annihilation, suddenly at flood, inflowing miraculously to a higher level of life" (Andrew Rugg Gunn, *Osiris and Odin*, London, 1940, pp. 152, 153). For, as Meister Eckhart has said, "He who would be what he ought to be must stop being what he is."

"He is a truly poor man (*sannyāsi*), he is a harnessed man (*yogī*) who does what ought to be done (*kāryam karma karoti*), regardless of consequences; not such is one who kindles no sacred fire and performs no rites" (BG VI.1).

In other words, the appetitive soul, the greedy mind, is the Sacrifice; we, as we are in ourselves, seeking ends of our own, are the appropriate burnt-offering: "The chariot of the gods (i.e., the body born of the Sacrifice) is yoked for the world of heaven, but that of man for wherever his purpose (*artha*) is fixed; the chariot of the gods is the Fire" (TS V.4.10.1, cf. AĀ II.3.8 *fin.*). We see why it is always assumed that the Sacrifice, even of an animal, is a voluntary one; there could be no inner meaning of an unwilling victim.⁴⁹ We see what is really accomplished by the heroic Indra (who, be it remembered, is an immanent deity, as the "Person in the right eye," and so *our* real Person) when he "crushes, rends and cuts to pieces Vṛtra's seat (*yoni*) and lair (*āsaya*),⁵⁰ and it becomes this offering," and so recovers the Vedas (ŚB V.5.5.4-6). Now as we have already seen, the sacrificer is the oblation (*havis*). He is identified with the *prastara*, which is anointed with the words, "May they (the gods) eat, licking the anointed bird" (VS II.16—"licking," because Agni is their mouth, his flames their tongues), thus "making it a bird and to fly up from the world of men to the world of the gods"; the *prastara* is like "any other corpse," except that it is to be touched with the fingers only, not with sticks (ŚB I.8.3.13-23). The sacrificer's "death" is at the same time his salvation; for the Self is his reward:⁵¹ "They who take part in a

⁴⁹ See further above and Appendix I.

⁵⁰ "Seat" or "womb," as in MU VI.34.1, 2, cited above; and "lair" (*āsaya*), hardly to be distinguished from "womb" (cf. Pāli *abbuda* = *arbuda*, as "foetus"), that in which the sense powers are *guhāsaya nihitāḥ*, Muṇḍ. Up. II.1.8. It is inasmuch as Varuṇa "lies" (*āsaye*) in them that Varuṇa, like Agni who makes them his seat, knows all the births of the gods, i.e., their births as the powers of the soul and all their workings (RV VIII.41.7). In RV I.32.7, that dis severed Vṛtra's lair is in many places (*pururā vṛtro āsayad vyāṣṭah*) suggests the Agni of III.55.4 (*vibhṛtaḥ pururā śaye*): cf. "I am the Spirit, my station in the lair (*āsaya*) of all beings. . . . Ananta am I of snakes" (BG X.20, 29). The cavern (*guhā*) from which the streams and all other living principles are released can be equated with the "bellies of the mountains" in RV I.32.1 and I.54.10. Cf. Isa. 51:1, "Look unto the rock whence ye are hewn, and to the hole of the pit whence ye are digged."

The "Person in the right eye" is regularly equated with "the Person in the Sun," of whom it is said that "He who is yonder, yonder Person in the Sun, I myself am he" (MU VI.35). It is only to my real Self, this "inward Person" (*antah puruṣa*), that the words "That art thou" can be applied; not to "this man" who still knows in the worldly sense who he is, by name and family descent.

⁵¹ Cf. JUB III.11.3, *yad dīkṣate . . . dakṣiṇām abhiyāyate*. Any reception of material gifts by Brāhmins participating in a sacrificial session (*sattra*) is condemned in the strongest possible terms (TS VII.2.10.2). Guerdons (*dakṣiṇā*) may and ought to be given only when the priests are sacrificing on behalf of others than themselves (ŚB IV.3.4.5), just as a Christian priest saying a Mass on another's behalf properly receives a fee.

sacrificial session (*sattra*) go to the world of heavenly light. They kindle (vivify) themselves with the initiations and cook (mature) themselves with the sacrificial seances. With two they cut off their hair (except the topknot), with two their skin, with two their blood, with two their flesh, with two their bones, with two their marrow. In the sacrificial session the Self is the guerdon (*ātma-dakṣiṇam*); verily receiving the Self as their guerdon, they go to the world of heaven. They cut off the topknot at last for success (*rddhyai*), thinking, 'More quickly may we attain to the world of heaven' (TS VII.4.9, cf. PB IV.9.19-22, ŚB I.8.3.16-19).⁵²

The mortal, psychophysical self (*ātman*) that the sacrificer immolates, whether as above ritually, or when he actually dies and is made an oblation (*āhuti*, AB II.4; ŚB II.2.4.8, XII.5.2.13; BU VI.2.14, 15, etc.) in the Fire (the sacrificial rite prefiguring his final resurrection from the Fire), while it acts as a unity (AĀ III.2.1, JUB IV.7.4, Kauṣ. Up. III.2, 8) is not one member (cf. I Cor. 12:12 ff.) but a compound (*samhata*, *samdeha*, *sambhūti*, *σύνκριμα*, etc.), or "host of elemental beings" (*bhūtagana*), called "elemental self" (*bhūtātman*) and, as such, distinguished (as in Plato) from "its immortal Self" (*amṛto'syātmā*, *ψυχῇ ψυχῆς*), the impassible and un-affected Inner Man (*antahpuruṣaḥ* = *prajñātman*, solar Self; cf. MU III.2, 3). In view of what has already been said of the Soma sacrifice, a symbolic self-immolation, it will not now surprise us to find that this passible "elemental self" is identified with Soma (*soma samjño'yam bhūtātman*, MU VI.10). Not, of course, the Soma that "was Vṛtra," or Varuṇya, but the Soma that still is Vṛtra, or Varuṇya; not Soma the Friend (*mitra*) but Soma the Titan (*asura*, ŚB XII.6.1.10, 11); not Soma the immortal, but the Soma that is to be pressed and slain and from whom the immortal extract is to be separated out. In MU VI.10 we are, accordingly, further reminded that Soma is the food and Fire the eater [it is with this Fire and not with the Soma that the Sacrificer identifies his Self], and that the Comprehensor of the equation Soma = *bhūtātman* is a truly poor man (*sannyāsi*), a harnessed man (*yogī*), and a "self-sacrificer" (*ātmayājī*), i.e., "one who himself officiates as his own sacrificial priest, as distinguished from the *devayājī*, for whom the sacrifice is

⁵² All this corresponds to the removal of the *annamaya* and other "sheaths" (*kośa*) of Brahma, to the "shaking off of bodies" (JUB I.15.5, III.30.2, etc.), essential because "no one becomes immortal with the body" (ŚB X.4.3.9). It is symbolized also in the Vaiṣṇava *vastra-haraṇa*. Love reminds us that "across my threshold naked all must pass." This is Philo's "noble nudity" (*ἀρίστη γύμνωσις*, *Legum allegoriae* 1.77).

performed by another, notably by the god (Agni, *devayājī*, ŚB *passim*)⁵³ as missal priest: the Sacrificer's immolation of himself, the "elemental self," is his "self-sacrifice" (*ātmayājña*).

In the same way we shall now be able to understand how in MU VI.35 the powers of the soul are equated with Soma shoots: here "of the Fire that is hidden within the Sky it is but a little measure that is the Water of Life (*amṛtam*) in the midst of the Sun, of which the growing shoots (*āpyay-aṇḍurāḥ*)⁵⁴ are Soma or the Breaths (*soma prāṇā vā*)." The equation of the breaths with Soma shoots is even more explicit in TS VI.4.4.4, *prāṇā vā amśavaḥ*, "the breaths are Soma shoots." Now we have seen that "Soma was Vṛtra," and that he emerges from these shoots "as the Serpent from his skin"; the powers of the soul, the collective soul itself are, then, Vṛtra's "seat and lair" from which the offering (*iṣṭi*) is extracted (ŚB V.5.5.1, 6, cited above). The real Soma sacrifice is the bruising of these shoots, the breaths, the elemental self or soul: "One withdraws (*uddhṛtya*) these breaths (from their objects)⁵⁵ and sacrifices them in the Fire" (*prāṇān . . . agnau juhōti*, MU VI.26); "the (immanent) deities⁵⁶ are the breaths, mind-born and mind-yoked, in them one

⁵³ Cf. RV I.142.11, *devān yakṣi, vanaspate*.

⁵⁴ This is my own reading of the text, avoiding all emendation.

⁵⁵ As in MU VI.19, BG II.58, IV.27, etc. and in all contemplative practice leading to synthesis (*samādhi*). Cf. Psalms 51:16, 17, "Thou delightest not in burnt offering. The sacrifices of God are a broken spirit."

⁵⁶ "All these deities are in me" (JUB I.14.2); "they make their home in me" (ŚB II.3.2.3); they are neither in heaven nor on earth, but in breathing creatures, i.e., living beings (*prāṇināḥ*, VS XVII.14). Strictly speaking, Prajāpati's children (his "breath forms" as Sāyaṇa calls them, cf. BU I.5.21 where it is after him Prajāpati, the Breath, and as his forms, *rūpāṇi*, that the powers of the soul are called "breaths") are gods and titans, competing in these worlds for possession of them; the sense organs of speech, scent, hearing, vision, and thought sang for the gods all fruition (*bhogān*) and for themselves whatever was beautiful (*kalyāṇam*), until the titans infected them with evil—that is, whatever is done by any of them informally (*apratirūpam*). Only the Breath remained immune to this infection, and he translates (*atyavahat*) the senses, striking off their evil, their mortality, so that each becomes its macrocosmic equivalent, speech becoming Agni, smell Vāyu, vision the Sun, hearing the Quarters of heaven, mind the Moon. The Breath then shares out the nourishment that it sings for itself (the Breath is the organ-blower, the breaths the Maruts that move in the bodily organ—"pipes, *nādyah*," into which they have been "put, *hitāḥ*"), playing the part of host to the breaths that take up their places round about him as a regiment of the "King's Own (*svāḥ*)" that at the same time forms his bodyguard and is fed by him. The Breath is identified with (Agni-) Brhaspati-Brahmanaspati, i.e., the Spiritual Power in which the Temporal Power inheres (BU I.3, cf. JUB II.8). It is in this sense that the gods were originally

sacrifices metaphysically" (*prāṇā vai devā, manojātā manoyuṣas, teṣu paroṣam juhōti*, TS VI.1.4.5, cf. JUB 1.40.3).⁵⁷

"Mind-born and mind-yoked": in the ever-recurrent simile of the chariot,⁵⁸ i.e., the bodily vehicle in which the solar spiritual Self takes up its stand as a passenger for so long as the chariot lasts, the sense organs are the steeds and the reins are held by the directing mind (*manas, voṣ*) on behalf of the passenger; "Savitṛ yokes the gods (*devāḥ = prāṇāḥ*) with mind, he impels them (*yuktvāya manasā devān . . . savitā prasuvati tām*, TS IV.1.1)." When the horses willingly obey the rein, the chariot conducts the passenger to his proper destination; but if they pursue their own ends, the natural objects of the senses, and the mind yields to them, the journey ends in disaster (it must be remembered that the mind is "twofold," bound by the senses or independent of them, MU IV.34, cf. Philo, *Legum allegoriae* 1.93). The man whose senses are under control, or "yoked" (*yuktāḥ, yujah*), i.e., the yogī, can say accordingly "I yoke myself, like an understanding horse (*svayam ayuṣi hayo na vidvān*, RV V.46.1)"; which is only another way of referring to those who "offer up all the workings of the senses and the breaths in the Fire of the *yoga* of self-control, kindled by gnosis" (BG IV.27).

It is now also clear why we are told in RV X.85.3-4 that though "they fancy when they crush the plant that they are drinking very Soma;

mortal (TS VII.4.2.1, ŚB II.2.2.8, etc.), and only by Agni's counsels, or by the sacrifice, or by making the *brahma* their own, attained their present dignity (*arahatta*), immortality (*amṛtatva*), and victory (*jīti*), RV VI.7.4, X.63.4, ŚB III.4.3.15, XI.2.3.6, etc.

⁵⁷ That is to say that when the sacrificer, in whom these powers are immanent, ceasing to use them for improper (*apratirūpa*) ends, i.e., the pursuit of pleasure, returns himself with the immanent deities to their source, then "he" becomes an immortal. It is not his personality but his Person that then survives after death, when "we who, in our junction with our bodies are mixtures and have qualities, shall not exist, but shall be brought into the rebirth, by which, becoming joined to incorporeal things, [we] shall become unmixed and without qualities" (Philo, *De cherubim*, 113 ff.). The TS passage sums up in a few words the whole thesis of "self-sacrifice," i.e., the sacrifice of oneself by oneself to one's Self, "this self's immortal Self" (MU III.2). Whoever will not make this sacrifice is "damned": "Whosoever hath not [possessed his Self], from him shall be taken away even that [self] he hath," Matt. 13:12.

⁵⁸ The symbol of the chariot is employed by Plato and the Platonists in exactly the same way. To exhibit the collation in full would require a separate article, but we may point out that the notion of a *yoking* of the senses is conspicuous in Hermes, *Asclepius* 1.5 ff.

yet of him the Brāhmins understand by 'Soma' none ever tastes, none tastes who dwells on earth."⁵⁹ The extracted juice is not immediately, not really Soma (*Sāyana, na ca sa sākṣāt somah*). The drinking of Soma, in other words, is a rite of transubstantiation; "it is metaphysically (*paroṣam*) that the Kṣatriya obtains the Soma drinking, it is not immediately (*pratyakṣam = sākṣāt*) partaken of by him . . . (but only) through the High Priest (*purodhas*), through the initiation (*dīkṣā*), and the ancestral invocation" (*pravara*, implying "apostolic succession"), AB VII.31; cf. ŚB III.6.2.9, where the Soma pressing stones are Initiation (*dīkṣā*) and Ardor (*tapas*); "they collect (*āhrtya*) the plant *uśānā* and press it, and by means of the initiation (*dīkṣā*) and the seances (*upasads*, sacrificial sittings-in), by the Tānūnaptra (-covenant) and the 'making to grow' (*āpyāyana*), they make it to be 'Soma'" (ŚB III.4.3.13); "by Faith, the daughter of Sūryā, he makes it (*surā*, brandy, properly the drink of the Asuras and loathsome to Brāhmins) to be Soma juice" (ŚB XII.7.3.11); that which was taken away from Namuci (Vṛtra) by the Aśvins is now drunk as Soma (ŚB XII.8.1.3-5), the "Supreme Offering" (VS XIX.2, ŚB XII.8.2.12).

Such is the significance of what is called the "Subjective Interior Burnt-offering" (*ādhyātmiṣam āntaram agnihotraḥ*), of which ŚA X.1 ff. affirms that "if one sacrifices, knowing not *this* Agnihotra, it is for him as though he pushed aside the coals and made oblation in the ashes."

The assumption of the Fire is described in ŚB II.2.2.8-20, of which the following is a summary. The gods (*devāḥ*) and titans (*asurāḥ*) were both the children of Prajāpati, both alike devoid-of-any-spiritual-Self (*anātmanah*) and consequently mortal: only Agni was immortal. Both parties set up their sacrificial Fires. The titans performed their rite externally (profanely); but "the gods then set up that Fire in their inward self (*enam . . . antaratman ādadhata*), and having done so became immortal and invincible and overcame their mortal and vincible foes." In the same way now the sacrificer sets up the sacrificial Fire within himself. As to this Fire thus kindled within him he thinks, "herein will I

⁵⁹ An explicit warning that the Elixir of Life is not a physical medicine of any kind; it is no more than the *fons vitae* to be found outside ourselves. Cf. AB II.14, ". . . the Soma oblation is one of ambrosia. These oblations are incorporeal (i.e., invisible and intangible); it is with those oblations that are incorporeal that the sacrificer wins immortality."

sacrifice, here do the good work." Nothing can come between him and this Fire;⁶⁰ "Surely, as long as I live, that Fire that has been set up in my inward self does not die down in me." He feeds that flame who utters right (*satyam*), and more and more becomes his own fiery force (*tejas*); he quenches it who utters wrong (*anṛtam*),⁶¹ and less and less becomes his fiery force. Its service is just "right."

Accordingly, "being about to edify Agni (build up the Fire-altar) the sacrificer apprehends him in himself (*ātmann agniṃ grhṇīte*); for it is from himself that he brings him to birth (*ātmano . . . adhiṣyate*, ŚB VII.4.1.1)." The true Agnihotra is, in fact, not a rite to be merely performed at fixed seasons, but within you daily,⁶² after the primordial pattern of the thirty-six thousand Arka-Fires that were of mental substance and mentally edified by the first sacrificers: "mentally (*manasā*)⁶³ were they edified, mentally were the cups of Soma drawn, mentally they chanted. . . . These

⁶⁰ Cf. AB VII.12, where if anything passes between the sacrificer and his ritual fires he may ignore it, because his fires "have been set up within himself (*ātmany asya hitā bhavanti*)."

⁶¹ For *satyam* (*ṛtam*) and *anṛtam* our words "truth" and "untruth" have a too definitely ethical and empirical significance to be entirely adequate; just as our word "sin" is too ethical to represent what is implied by Sanskrit and Greek terms meaning "incorrect," or more literally, "missing the mark." Properly speaking, "sin," as defined by St. Thomas Aquinas, is "any departure from the order to the end," and not merely moral error. *Satyam* and *anṛtam* are nearer to "correct" (*integer*) and "incorrect." In the same way, virtue (*kausalam*, Pāli *kusalam*), like wisdom (*σοφία*), is radically "skill"; and the beautiful (*kalyāṇa*, *καλός*) not what we like, but whatever is appropriate or "in good form (*pratirūpa*)," as opposed to what is ugly, improper, or more literally "informal (*apratirūpa*); nor are these merely "aesthetic" values, for *kalyāṇa* and *kausalā*, *kusala*, are both opposed to *pāpa*, "evil" or "foul," as in Scholastic philosophy *pulcher* is opposed to *turpis*, whether as "ugly" or as "disgraceful." Only what is correct is effective; and hence the great emphasis laid on the correct, i.e., beautiful, performance of the sacrificial rites, and the necessity for expiation in the case of any error (*Brāhmaṇas, passim*). Whenever the conduct of life is sacramentally envisaged, this perfectionism is carried over into every possible field of doing or making: in the single concept of skill, "prudence" and "art" coincide. "Skillful performance is Yoga (*yogaḥ karmasu kausalam*, BG II.50)."

⁶² Similarly AĀ II.3.8 (the 36,000 days of a man's life), and KU IV.8 (*dive diva idyo . . . haviṣmadbhir manuṣyebhir agniḥ*, "The Fire should be served every day with human oblations"). In this sense human sacrifice is essential to salvation.

⁶³ *Manasā*, "with the mind as instrument" or "mentally," occurs some 80 or more times in RV, frequently in connection with the Sacrifice—e.g., I.172.2, *stomo . . . hṛdā taṣṭau manasā*; II.40.3, *ratham . . . manasā yuyamānam* (cf. V.46.1, *svayam ayuji*); VII.64.4, *gartaṃ manasā takṣat*; VII.67.1, *haviṣmata manasā yajniyena*; similarly VI.16.4, *haviṣ hṛdā taṣṭam*. We have no reason to suppose that the Sacrifice had ever been a merely mechanical operation.

Fires, indeed, are knowledge-built (*vidyācita eva*); and for the Comprehensor thereof all beings (*sarvāṇi bhūtāni*, all the powers of the soul) build up these Fires, even while he is asleep." And so "by knowledge (*vidyayā*) they ascend to where desires have migrated (*parāgatāḥ*); it is not by guerdons (*dakṣiṇābhiḥ*) nor by ignorant ardour (*avidvamsaḥ tapasvinaḥ*) . . . but only to Comprehensors that that world belongs" (ŚB X.5.4.16). This last passage states explicitly what is clearly implied by RV VIII.70.3, cited above.

A distinction is thus clearly drawn between mere performance and the understanding of what is done, performance as such and performance as the support of contemplation; and between an objective performance on stated occasions and a subjective and incessant performance. The first of these distinctions is made again in ŚB X.4.2.31, "Whosoever as a Comprehensor performs this sacred work, or even one who is a Comprehensor (but does not actually perform the rites), puts together again this (divided) Prajāpati, whole and complete" (and therewith at the same time reintegrates himself); and again in ŚB XIII.1.3.22, where the distinction is drawn between those who are merely "seated at a sacrificial session" (*sattrasadaḥ*) and those who are "seated in reality" (*satisadaḥ*), only those who thus sacrifice in truth being "seated amongst the very gods" (*satīsu devatāsu śidantāḥ*).

The *satisad* is the same as the Ātmayājī referred to above, namely one who is his own priest. The *ātmayājī* is "one who knows, 'this (new) body of mine hath been integrated (*samskriyata*), hath been superimposed (*upadhīyate*) by that body (of the Sacrifice)'; and even as Ahi from his skin, so does he free himself from this mortal body, from the evil (*pāpmanas*, i.e., from Vṛtra), and as an offering (*āhuti*),⁶⁴ as one composed of the Three Vedas, so he passes on to the world of heavenly light. But the Devayājī (for whom another officiates), who merely knows that 'I am sacrificing this (victim) to the gods, I am serving the gods,' is like an inferior who brings tribute to (*balim haret*) a superior . . . he does not win so much of a world" (ŚB XI.2.6.13, 14).⁶⁵ The distinction

⁶⁴ "Having come into being from Agni, the womb of the gods (cf. JB I.17) from the oblation, with a body of gold (= light, immortality) he proceeds to the world of heavenly light" (AB II.14); and similarly in ŚB XII.2.2.5-6, and many like contexts.

⁶⁵ Cf. JUB I.14.1, "He should not be one whose gods are far away. Verily, it is insofar as he approaches the gods with himself (*ātmanā devān upāste*, i.e., is an *ātmayājī*) that become gods for him"; and BU I.4.10, "So whoever approaches a deity as being other, thinking 'He is one, and I another,' does not comprehend; he

is of active and passive *vīae*, of "salvation" from "liberation." The Ātmayājī is "one who sacrifices in himself" (*ātmann eva yajati*, MU VII.9). "Seeing the Self⁶⁶ impartially in all beings and all beings in the Self, the Ātmayājī obtains autonomy" (*svarājyam*, *Mānavadharmasāstra* XII.91; cf. CU VIII.1.1-6, BG VI.29).

The foregoing interpretation of the Sacrifice as an exhaustive series of symbolic acts to be treated as supports of contemplation (*dhiyālamba*) reflects a traditional assumption that every practice (*πρᾶξις*) implies and involves a corresponding theory (*θεωρία*). The observation of ŚB IX.5.1.42 that the building of the Fire (-altar) includes "all kinds of works" (*viśvā karmāni*) assimilates the sacrificer to the archetypal sacrificer, Indra, who is preeminently the "All-worker" (*viśvakarmā*). It is just because the Sacrifice, if it is to be correctly performed (and this is quite indispensable), demands the skilled cooperation of all kinds of artists, that it necessarily determines the form of the whole social structure. And this means that in a completely traditional society there is no real distinction of sacred from profane operations; rather, as the late A. M. Hocart expressed it, "chaque occupation est un sacerdoce";⁶⁷ and it is a consequence that in such societies, "the needs of the body and the soul are satisfied together."⁶⁸ In view of this, it will not surprise us to find what in any investigation of the "caste system" must never be overlooked, namely, that the primary application and reference of the verb *kr* (*creo*, *κρᾶίω*), to do or make, and the noun *karma*, action or making, is to sacrificial operation (cf. Grassmann, s.vv., *insbesondere, opfern, Opferwerk*; and Lat. *operari* = *sacra facere*). It will be as true of every agent as it is for the king that whatever he does of himself, unsupported by any spiritual reason, will be to all intents and purposes "a thing not done" (*akṛtam*). What might otherwise seem to our secular eyes a revolutionary principle, viz. that the true Sacrifice ("making sacred," *ἱεροποιία*) is to be performed daily and hourly in each and every one of our func-

is a mere victim for them." Similarly Meister Eckhart, "Some there are so simple as to think of God as if He dwelt *there*, and of themselves as being *here*. It is not so, God and I are one" (Pfeiffer ed., p. 206).

⁶⁶ The solar Self of RV I.115.1 and AV x.8.44.

⁶⁷ *Les Castes*, Paris, 1938, p. 27.

⁶⁸ R. R. Schmidt, *Dawn of the Human Mind*, London, 1936, p. 167. That manufacture should serve the needs of body and soul at one and the same time was also Plato's demand; and wherever there is not this intention, man is attempting to live an atrophied existence, by "bread alone."

tionings—*teṣu paroṣaṃ juhōti*, TS VI.1.4.5—is really implicit in the concept of action (*karma*) itself; it is, in fact, only *inaction*, what is *not* done, that can be thought of as unholy, and this is explicit in the sinister meaning of the word *krtyā*, "potentiality" personified; the perfect man is "one who has done what there is to do" (*kṛtakṛtaḥ*), the Arhat *ṣaṭkaṭam kārāṇiyam*. The sacrificial interpretation of the whole of life itself, the *karma mārga* doctrine of the *Bhagavad Gītā*, is implicit in texts already cited, and explicit in many others, e.g., JUB IV.2, where the man is the Sacrifice, and his breaths, the powers of the soul, acting as Vasus, Rudras, and Ādityas, carry out the morning, midday, and evening pressings (i.e., the Soma sacrifice) during his first 24, second 44, and last 48 years of a life of 116 years. Similarly CU III.16, followed by III.17, where privation is equated with initiation, enjoyments with the sacrificial sessions and chantings, the virtues with the guerdons, generation with regeneration, and death with the last ritual ablution. In the same way in the "thousand years" operation of the all-emanating (*viśvasṛjaḥ*) deities, "Death is the slayer" (*śamitr*, PB xxv.18.4), who *dispatches* the resurrected victim to the gods.⁶⁹

In Kauṣ. Up. II.5, in Hume's version appropriately entitled "A person's entire life symbolically a Soma-sacrifice," it is affirmed with respect to the Interior Burnt-offering (*āntaram agnihotra*) that our very breathings in and out (*prāṇāpānau*: the two primary breaths or lives, which include and represent all those of sight, hearing, thought, and speech, etc., AĀ II.3.3) "are two endless ambrosial oblations (*nante amṛtāhūtī*) that whether waking or sleeping one offers up (*juhōti*) continuously and without a break; and whatever other oblations there are, have an end (*antavatyas tāḥ*), for they amount to no more than activity as such (*karmamāyo hi bhavanti*). And verily the Comprehensors thereof in former time abstained from making actual burnt offerings (*agnihotram na juhuvām cakruḥ*)." It is from the same point of view that the Buddha, who found and followed the ancient Way of the former Fully Awakened (S II.106, etc.) and expressly denies that he taught a doctrine of his own invention (M I.77), pronounces: "I pile no wood for altar fires; I kindle a flame within me (*ajjhatam* = *adhyātmikam*), the heart the hearth, the flame thereon the dominated self" (*attā sudantā*, S I.169; i.e., *saccena danto*, S I.168 = *satyena dantaḥ*). We have seen already that one who has slain his Vṛtra, i.e., dominated self, and is thus a true autocrat (*sva-*

⁶⁹ On the "happy dispatch," cf. Appendix 1.

rāj), is liberated from the law according to which the Sacrifice is factually performed (TS II.5.4.5); and in the same way in AĀ III.2.6, the Kāvaṣeyas who (as in Kauṣ. Up. II.5, cf. BG IV.29) sacrifice the incoming breath when they speak and the outgoing breath when they remain silent, ask: "To what end should we recite the Veda (cf. BG II.46), to what end should we sacrifice externally)?"⁷⁰

In the sacrificial interpretation of life, acts of all kinds are reduced to their paradigms and archetypes, and so referred to Him from whom all action stems; when the "notion that I am the doer" (*ahamkāra*, *karto'ham asmīti*) has been overcome, and acts are no longer "ours," when we are no longer any one (*vivo autem, jam non ego sed Christus in me*, Gal. 2:20), then we are no longer "under the law," and what is done can no more affect our essence than it can His whose organs we are. It is in this sense only, and not by vainly trying to do nothing, that the causal chain of fate (*karma* with its *phalāni*) can be "broken"; not by any miraculous interference with the operation of mediate causes, but because "we" are no longer part and parcel of them. The reference of all activities to their archetypes (essentially a *reductio artium ad theologiam*) is what we ought to mean when we speak of "rationalizing" our conduct; if we cannot give a true account (ratio, λόγος) of ourselves and our doings it will mean that our actions have been "as you like it (*vrthā*)," reckless (*asamkhyānam*) and informal (*apratirūpam*) rather than to the point (*sādhu*) and in good form (*pratirūpam*).⁷¹

For one who has completely realized the sacrificial implications of every action, one who is leading not a life of his own in this world but a transubstantiated life, there are no compulsory forms. This must not be understood to mean that he must adopt the role of a nonconformist, a "must" that would be altogether incompatible with the concept of "freedom." If, in the last analysis, the Sacrifice is a mental operation even for the *Ṛg Veda*, where the ritual acts are mentally performed (*manasā, passim*) but it is not to be inferred that there is no manual procedure, it is also true that an emphasis on the ultimate inwardness of the Burnt-offering by no

⁷⁰ It is, no doubt, in their character as nonsacrificers that the Kāvaṣeyas of RV VII.18.2 are enemies of Indra, whose very *raison de devenir* is sacrificial operation. They have, by their repudiation of the divine activity and imitation of the divine idleness, become again Asuras, and are no longer the loyal subjects of the king of this world.

⁷¹ Cf. notes 56 and 61. Right offering is whatever is neither excessive nor defective in the Sacrifice (ŚB XI.2.3.9).

means necessarily involves a disparagement of the physical acts that are the supports of contemplation. The priority of the contemplative does not destroy the real validity of the active life, just as in art the primacy of the free and imaginative *actus primus* does not remove the utility of the manual *actus secundus*. In the *karma mārga*, *karma* retains, as we have seen, its sacrificial implications. A mere and ignorant performance of the rites had always been regarded as insufficient (*na karmāṇā . . . na yajñaiḥ*, RV VIII.70.3). If the *karma* of the *Bhagavad Gītā* is essentially (*svabhāvānīyatam*, XVIII.47 = κατὰ φύσιν) a work to which one is called by one's own nature or nativity, this had been equally true in the Vedic period when the sacrificial operation involved "all kinds of works" and the acts of the carpenter, doctor, fletcher, and priest had all been regarded as ritual "operations (*vratāni*)."⁷² And so as BG IV.15, reminding us of several contexts cited above, affirms and enjoins, "Understanding this, the sacrificial work was performed even by the ancients desirous of liberation (*kṛtaṁ karma pūrvair api mumukṣubhiḥ*); so do thou do work (*kuru karma*) even as by the ancients of old it was done." It is true that, as the Vedānta consistently maintains, man's last end is unattainable by any means, whether sacrificial or moral, but it is never forgotten that means are dispositive to that end: "This Spiritual Self is not to be taken hold of (*labhyaḥ*) by the weak, nor in arrogance, nor by ardor without its countersign (of poverty); but he who being a Comprehensor labors (*yatate*) with these means (*upāya*), that Self dwells in Brahma-home" (Muṇḍ. Up. III.2.4).

We have seen that the conquest of Ahi-Vṛtra, the slaying and eating⁷² of the Dragon, is nothing but the domination of the self by the Self; and that the Burnt-offering is the symbol and should be the fact of this conquest. "He who makes the Burnt-offering (*agnihotram*) tears up the snare of greed, cuts down delusion and disparages anger" (MU VI.38); and so, "transcending the elemental powers and their objects . . . he whose bowstring is his solitary life⁷³ and whose arrow is his lack of the conceit

⁷² The eucharistic meal is of extreme importance in the Sacrifice. The essential and only indispensable part of the victim is the heart, for this is the mind, the life-breath and the "very self" of the victim; it is basted with *ghī* on a spit, and so made to be that living food of which the gods partake. In the Edda, Sigurd understands the language of birds ("angels," cf. René Guénon, "La Langue des oiseaux," *Voile d'Isis*, xxxvi, 1931) when he tastes of Fafnir's heart.

⁷³ The *parivṛjaka's* quest (a Grail quest, like that of the Vedic *ṛṣayaḥ*) is strictly analogous to that of the knight errant and to that of the solar hero in our fairy tales. There must be no looking back (ŚB XII.5.2.15).

of self-existence,⁷⁴ fells the keeper of the first of Brahma's palace-gates, whose crown is delusion . . . and who slays all these beings with the arrow of wishful thinking," and may enter Brahma's palace, whence he can look down upon the revolving wheel as may the charioteer upon the turning wheels of his vehicle; "but for one who is smitten and enflamed by darkness and passion, a body-dweller attached to son or wife or kindred, no, never at all!" (Kauṣ. Up. 1.4 and MU vi.28).⁷⁵ This "keeper" is assuredly the Dragon on the Hero's path and the Guardian of the Tree of Life; in other words, the Death that every Solar Hero must overcome. We hope to show elsewhere that Indra's defeat of Ahi-Vṛtra and the Bodhisatta's conquest of Māra are relations of one and the same universal mythos. Here we have only proposed to emphasize that the Dragon, or Giant—by whatever name, whether we call him Ahi, Vṛtra, Soma, Prajāpati or Puruṣa, or Osiris or Dionysos or Ymir—is always himself the Sacrifice, the sacrificial victim; and that the Sacrificer, whether divine or human, is always himself this victim, or else has made no real sacrifice.

In sacrificing himself in the beginning, the Solar Hero, having been single, makes himself—or is made to be—many for the sake of those into whom he must enter if they are to find their Way "from darkness to light, death to immortality" (BU 1.3.28). He divides himself, and "Except ye eat the flesh of the Son of man, and drink his blood, ye have no life in you" (John 6:53); and as we have seen, he is swallowed up in us, like a buried treasure. In this cosmic crucifixion the Sacrifice is "extended"; and insofar as we think and act in terms of the pairs of opposites, think of him in the noumenal and phenomenal aspect under which he enters into the world (ŚB xi.2.3.4, 5), we "crucify him daily." If his sacrifice is an act of grace, and it is because of his love (*preṇā*) for his offspring that he enters into them (TS v.5.2.1) in whom as only Saṃsārin (BrSBh 1.1.5) he submits to repeated deaths (JUB III.1.1 ff., cf. RV x.72.9), it is, on the other hand, a murder that is committed by whoever, human or divine, sacrifices another; the slaying and dismem-

⁷⁴ Cf. Muṇḍ. Up. 11.2.3, where the arrow is oneself, Brahma the target. ["Such a blind shot with the sharp dart of longing love may never fail of the prick, which is God," *Epistle of Discretion*, by the author of the *Cloud of Unknowing* (cf. Edmund Gardner, ed., *The Cell of Self-knowledge*, London, 1910, for text of the Epistle).]

⁷⁵ "If any man come to me, and hate not his father and mother, and wife, and children, and brethren, and sisters, yea, and his own life (ψυχή, soul) also, he cannot be my disciple" (Luke 14:26).

berment of Vṛtra is, in fact, on Indra's part an original sin (*kīlbiṣa*) because of which he is often excluded from the Soma drinking, and for which atonement must be made (TS 11.5.3.6, AB vii.31, KB xv.3; cf. ŚB 1.2.3, III.9.4.17, XII.6.1.40, etc.).⁷⁶

"We" are aggregates of the functional powers that are the offspring (*prajāh*) of Prajāpati (Brahma, Ātman, Prāṇa, Sun) and the names of his acts; it is the universal Self that operates in each of our many selves, seeing, thinking, etc., into which it is divided; it is this Self that collects itself when we die, and that passes on to other habitations, the nature of which is predetermined by its own former activities. Whether or not "we" survive this passage will depend upon whether our consciousness of being—not to be confused with our "waking" powers of perception, of which nothing survives the transition⁷⁷—is in him, or in "ourselves." It remains, however, for this Wanderer, and for us if we have known him and not merely ourselves, to "collect himself" once and for all and to return from this round of becomings to himself; having been many, he must again become one; having died again and again, he must be resurrected once and for all. The second phase of the Sacrifice, then, and from our present position in the manifold the most essential part of it, consists in the putting together (*saṃdhā*) again of what had been dismembered, and the building up (*saṃskṛ*) of another and unitary Self that shall be our Self when this present self is no more. This unification and "coming into one's own" is at once a death, a rebirth, an assimilation, and a marriage.

We must not, however, suppose that "we" are the heroes of this cosmic drama: there is but One Hero. It is the God that "feters himself by himself like a bird in the net" laid by the huntsman Death, and the God that breaks out of the snare,⁷⁸ or, otherwise stated, crosses over the torrent of life and death to its further shore by the bridge that is made of his own Spirit, or as one climbing reaches the top of the tree to rest on his eyrie or soar at will. He, and not this man So-and-so, is my Self, and it is not by any acts of "mine," but only by knowing Him (in the sense that knowing and being are one), by knowing Who we are that "we"

⁷⁶ Just as in the slaying of Soma, Mitra does a "cruel deed" (TS vi.4.8.1).

⁷⁷ "After death there is no consciousness" (*na pretya saṃjñāsti*, BU 11.4.12): "the dead know not anything" (Eccl. 9:5).

⁷⁸ "Liberation is for the Gods, not for man" (A. H. Gebhard-L'Estrange, *The Tradition of Silence in Myth and Legend*, Boston, 1940, p. 7). In the *Philosophia Perennis*, this is as strictly orthodox as Śāṅkara's "Verily, there is no other transcendent than the Lord" (BrSBh 1.1.5).

can be set free. That is why all traditions have insisted upon the primary necessity of self-knowledge: not in the modern psychologist's sense, but in that of the question "Which self?" that of the oracle "Know thyself," and that of the words *Si ignoras te, egredere*. "By the Self one findeth manhood, by comprehension findeth immortality; great is the destruction if one hath not found Him here and now! (*ātmanā vindate vīryam, vidyayā vindate mṛtam . . . na ced ihā vedin mahatī vinaṣṭiḥ*, JUB IV.19.4, 5)." "With himself he indwells the Self, who is a Comprehensor thereof" (*saṃviśaty ātmanātmānam ya evaṃ veda*, VS XXXII.11). "What thou, Agni, art, that may I be!" (TS 1.5.7.6).

APPENDIX 1: ON PEACE

"What is the best thing of all for a man,
that he may ask from the gods?"
"That he may be always at peace with himself."
Contest of Homer and Hesiod, 320.

Soma's "pacification" is his *quietus* as a Varuṇya principle. Cf. TS II.1.9.2, where by means of Mitra the priest "pacifies" (*śamayati*) Varuṇa, and thus frees the sacrificer from Varuṇa's noose; and TS v.5.10.5, where the dangerous deities might suck in (*dhyāyeyuḥ*) the sacrificer and he "appeases" (*śamayati*) them with the oblations. The ritual slayer is a *śamitr*, one who gives the *quietus* (RV v.43.4, ŚB III.8.3.4, etc.). In the same way, the sacrifice of the Christian victim is for atonement, to make peace with the angry Father. And while appeasement implies a satisfaction or gratification of the person appeased, it must never be overlooked that peace (*śānti*) can never be made with an enemy; in one way or another he must be put to death as an enemy (although "it is his evil, not himself that they slay") before he can be made a friend of. So when the will is pacified (*upaśāmyate*, MU VI.34) it is "stilled," and when the psychophysical self is "conquered and pacified (*jita . . . praśāntaḥ*, BG VI.7)" by the Supreme Self, it has been sacrificed. Desire cannot survive the attainment of its object; only the "dead" who do not desire, because their desire is realized, are at peace; and hence the frequent association of the words *akāma* (without desire) and *āptakāma* (with desire attained), e.g., BU IV.3.21 and IV.4.6.

There is similarly in Lat. *pax* a sinister significance (well seen in the

case of imperialistic wars of "pacification"); the connections of the word are with *pangere*, *paciscor*, and Skr. *pāśa*, "fetter," esp. of Death. Eng. dispatch (esp. in the sense to "kill") contains the same root; the victim's is a "happy dispatch" precisely because he is released or unleashed from the fetter or penalty imposed by the Law. A treaty of peace is a thing imposed (primary sense of *pangere*) on an enemy: it is only insofar as the enemy, presumed a rebel (the war being just and the victory that of right rather than might, as is assumed in all traditional ordeals including those of single or other combat), repents and willingly submits to the bonds into which he enters, that the "peace" is really an "agreement," the *śānti* a *saṃjñāna*, and that is why the "consent" of the sacrificial victim is always secured; cf. ŚB XIII.2.8.2, where that "they make it consent (*saṃjñāpayanti*) means that they kill the victim." In this case the "enemy" is really resurrected as a "friend"; or in other words, it is not himself but his evil that is "killed."

There is thus a kind of peace (which I have elsewhere called "internecine") that can be only too easily understood; but also another "that passeth all understanding." It is only the peace by agreement that is real and that can endure; and it is for this reason that Gandhi would rather see the English relinquish, i.e., sacrifice, their hold on India of their own free will than see them compelled to do so by force. The same applies to the holy war of the Spirit with the carnal soul; if there is to be "unity in the bond of peace" (Eph. 4:3), the soul must have "put itself to death," and not simply have been suppressed by *force majeure* of violent asceticism and penances. And similarly in the case of the "war of the sexes," which is only a special case of war of the Spirit with the Soul.

APPENDIX 2: ŚESA, ANANTA, ANANTARAM

TS II.4.12, *yad aśiṣyata* = RV I.28.9, *ucchiṣṭam*, not the "dregs" of Soma, but what is "left" when the Soma has been extracted from the now dry twigs or husks. In this inexhaustible *ucchiṣṭam* (as in Vṛtra) all things are contained (AV XI.7), "everything is synthesized within it (*ucchiṣṭe . . . viśvam antaḥ samāhitam*, AV XI.7.1)"; "plenum is That (Brahma), plenum This (All), when plenum is out-turned (*udacyate*) from plenum, (e.g., This All from Vṛtra) plenum remains" (*avaśiṣyate*, BU v.5), ". . . yea, That may we know today whence This was poured out" (*uto*

tad adya vidhyāma yatas tat parisicyate, AV x.8.29; Whitney's "that . . . whence that" for *tad . . . yatas tat* betrays the literal and the logical sense). Brahma, in other words, is infinite (*anantaram*), the *brahma-yoni* inexhaustible.

Yad asiṣyata = Śeṣa, i.e., Ananta, the World Serpent, the Swallower in whom all possibilities whatever are latent and from whom all possibilities of manifestation are extracted; and this endless (*ananta*) circle is precisely that of Midgardsworm (*Gylfiginning*, 46–48) [see *Edda Snorra Sturlusonar með Skáldatali*, ed. Guðni Jónsson (Reykjavik, 1935)—ED.], that of "der Schlange, die sich in den eigenen Schwanz beisst, [und die] stellt den Äon dar" (Alfred Jeremias, *Der Antichrist in Geschichte und Gegenwart*, Leipzig, 1930, p. 5), that of Agni "footless and headless, hiding both his ends (*apād asīrṣā guhamāno antā*) when first born in the region's ground (*budhne rajasah*, i.e., as Ahi Budhnya), from his womb (*asya yonau*, RV iv.1.11; cf. x.79.2, *guhā śiro nihitam rḍhag akṣī*)," Prajāpati "sightless, headless, recumbent (*apaśyam amukḥam śayānam*, JUB iii.38)," Vṛtra-Kumāra "handles and footless (*ahastam . . . apādam*, RV x.30.8)." In the same way Brahma "was the one and only Endless (*eko'nantah*, MU vi.17)," Brahma has no ends (*anto nāsti yad brahma*, TS vii.3.1.4), "footless he came into being erst (*apād agre samabhavat*, AV x.8.21)," ⁷⁹ "as an Asura (*so'gre asurābhavat*):" he (Akṣara) is a "blind (-worm) and deaf (-adder) having no interval (*acaḥsuṣṭam āśrotram . . . anantaram*, BU iii.8.8);" "both blind and deaf, without hands or feet (*acaḥsuḥśrotram tad apāny apādam . . . bhūtayonim*, Muṇḍ. Up. 1.2.6);" the "endless (*anantam*)" Chant is like a necklace "of which the ends come together (*samantam*)," a serpent constricting its coils (*bhogān samāhṛtya*, meaning also "assembling its enjoyments"), and the Year,⁸⁰

⁷⁹ Cf. "Inasmuch as he came into being footless (*apād*), he (Vṛtra) was the Serpent (Ahi)," ŚB i.6.3.9. The Commentary on AV iv.6.1 equates the prime-born Brahma, who drank the Soma and made its poison harmless, with Takṣaka (Śeṣa).

AV iv.6.3 makes Garutman the first drinker of the poison. This Garutman is probably that one of the two Suparnā of RV i.164.20 that eats of the fruit of the tree; there may be a real connection of *viṣa*, poison, and *viṣaya*, object of perception. In any case these legends are perhaps the prototypes for the Puranic myth of Śiva's drinking of the poison produced at the Churning of the Ocean.

⁸⁰ Cf. AV x.8.12, "Ending, indeed, but endless inasmuch as his (Brahma-Prajāpati's) ends are united," or "finite, indeed, but infinite because of confinity (*anantam . . . antavac cā samante*); these two (ends, confines) the Keeper of the Vault, comprehending what hath been and shall be (*bhūtam uta bhavyam*) thereof, goes on distinguishing (*carati vicinvan*)." This is the "entering in of time from

"endless" because its two ends, Winter and Spring, are united (*samdhatah*, JUB i.35.7 ff.). The Buddha is "footless (*apadam*, Dh 179)," like Māra (A iv.434, M i.180).

"What is the beginning, that is the end" (Keith), or rather "He who is the coming forth is also the returning (*yo hy eva prabhavaḥ sa evāpyayah*, AĀ iii.2.6; cf. KU vi.11, Maṇḍ. Up. 6, and BG xviii.16)." "His before and after are the same" (*yad asya pūrvam āparam tad asya*, AB iii.43); in other words, "He is fontal and inflowing" (Eckhart), his departure when we end is "the flight of the alone to the alone" (Plotinus). And accordingly "That" is what remains there (*atra pariṣiṣyate*) when the body-dweller (*dehinah*, not my "soul" but my Self) is untied and liberated from the body (KU v.4); what then remains over (*atiṣiṣyate*) is the immortal Self (*ātman*, CU viii.1.4–5). As it is in and as this Self that the Comprehensor is reborn from the pyre, the "transcendent residue (*atiśeṣa*)" is the analogue there of the "residue (*śeṣa*)" that he leaves behind him *here* to inherit the character from which, as *brahmavit* and *brahmabhūta*, he has now been released from mortal manifestation to immortal essence without distinction of *āpara* from *para brahma*. Therefore the Serpent (*nāga*) is the interpretation (*nirvacanam*) of the "religious whose issues have ceased (*kṣiṇāsava bhikkṣhu*, M i.142–45)": as is Brahma *akṣara*. "The last step to fare without feet"; "in me is no I and no we, I am naught, without head without feet" (Rūmī, *Dīvān*, pp. 137, 295). Thus "we are brought face to face with the astounding fact [less astounding, perhaps, in view of what has been said above] that Zeus, father of gods and men, is figured by his worshippers as a snake," and the correlative fact that "all over Greece the dead hero was worshipped in snake form and addressed by euphemistic titles akin to that of Meilichios" (Jane Harrison, *Prolegomena to the Study of the Greek Religion*, Cambridge, 1922, pp. 18, 20, 325 ff.).⁸¹ God is the undying, or rather ever renascent Serpent, with whom every Solar Hero must do battle, and to whom in turn the Hero is assimilated when he tastes of the great antagonist's flesh and blood. We take this opportunity to call attention to the Story of King Karade in the "Alsatian Parzival,"⁸² a legend

the halls of the outer heaven," the bisection or decapitation of Makha-Vṛtra, the "act of creation," and the first act of the Sacrifice of which the last end is to reunite the "head" with the "body."

⁸¹ The "beards" of the Greek snakes perhaps represent the "spectacle marks" of a cobra.

⁸² Cf. E. K. Heller, "The Story of the Sorcerer's Serpent," *Speculum*, xv (1940), 338 ff., and literature there cited.

that recalls in more than one detail the Indian versions of the enmities of Indra and Vṛtra. In the Karade story, the sorcerer Elyafres, who himself performs the Green Knight's feat, allowing himself to be decapitated and later reappearing uninjured, is the Queen's lover and the natural father of the King's supposed son Karados. Elyafres has been decapitated by Karados, and when he reappears at the end of a year to return blow for blow, in place of any physical blow he reveals to Karados his true paternity. Karados, however, takes the side of his legal father. The Queen then persuades Elyafres to create a serpent, to be the destroyer of Karados, just as Vṛtra is created to be Indra's mortal enemy, with the same result in both cases, the intended victor becoming either directly or indirectly itself the sufferer. The serpent winds itself about Karados' arm, and cannot be undone. Karados is only saved by his betrothed, Guingenier, and her brother; Guingenier exposes her breast to the serpent's gaze, and when it extends itself towards her, the brother cuts it to pieces. We shall not attempt to analyze the whole of this most interesting myth here, but point out that the sorcerer Elyafres corresponds to Tvaṣṭṛ, the Māyin; Karados to Indra, who is Tvaṣṭṛ's son and enemy as Karados is Elyafres'; the serpent to Ahi-Vṛtra; and that the motif of the coils corresponds to the event as related in TS v.4.5.4, where Vṛtra "ties up Indra in sixteen coils (*soḍaśabhir bhogair asināt*). From these coils Indra can only be freed by Agni, who burns them. In the Indian mythology, Agni is Indra's brother; in the Karade story, it is not, indeed, the hero's brother, but it is his brother-in-law that destroys the serpent.

APPENDIX 3: NAKULA: Ὀφιομάχης

In AV vi.139.6, we find a love charm, "as the mongoose, having cut to pieces a snake, puts it together again, so do thou, herb of virility, put together again what of love was cut to pieces (*yathā naḥulo vichidya samdadhāti ahim punaḥ, eva . . .*). The mongoose is, indeed, a killer of snakes, an *ahihan*, but it has not been recorded by naturalists that it can put them together again. Perhaps we should have said, "as the Mongoose, having cut Ahi (-Vṛtra) to pieces, puts him together again." In order to solve this riddle, we shall go far afield before returning to it.

In Lev. 11:22, the word *hargal*, one of four creatures presumed to be insects and permitted to be used as food, is rendered in the Revised

Version by "beetle" and in the Septuagint by ὀφιομάχης, lit. "snake-fighter." Philo (*De opificio mundi* 1.39) says that "this is an animal (ἐρπετόν)⁸³ having legs above its feet, with which it springs from the ground and lifts itself into the air like a grasshopper." This is a fair description of the behavior of a mongoose or ichneumon in the presence of a snake, and is also justified by the derivation of *hargal* from √*harag*, to leap suddenly; that is what a mongoose does when struck at by a snake, thus avoiding the blow; in any case the Hebrews did not eat beetles, but might eat quadrupeds "which have legs above their feet, to leap withal upon the earth" (Lev. 11:21), i.e., having legs long enough to do so, and there is nothing in the text of vv.21, 22 to show that all four of the creatures listed in v.22 must have been insects. However, we shall not say anything more about *hargal*, as it is sufficient for our purpose that it is rendered in the Septuagint, which Philo follows, by ὀφιομάχης, and in the Vulgate by *ophiomachus*.

According to Hesychius, ὀφιομάχης is ἰχνεύμων, and also a kind of wingless locust. This ambiguity can be explained by the fact that there is an "ichneumon fly," a kind of wasp, doubtless so called because it lays its eggs in caterpillars and so kills them,⁸⁴ and hence might be called a "snake killer" if we bear in mind that snakes are traditionally "worms." But such wasps are neither edible nor wingless, and there can be no doubt that our ὀφιομάχης is an ichneumon, i.e., the Egyptian mongoose, *Herpes ichneumon*, an animal that "tracks" (as the word ἰχνεύμων implies)⁸⁵

⁸³ The rendering of ἐρπετόν by "reptile" (Colson and Whitaker in LCL) is impossible. Philo cannot have meant this, as he would have known very well that the Hebrews did not eat reptiles; the original sense of ἐρπετόν, despite the etymology, identical with that of "serpent," is merely that of "quadruped" as distinguished from "biped" (H. G. Liddell and R. Scott, *A Greek-English Lexicon*), and it is certainly in this sense that Philo used the word.

⁸⁴ The Indians were aware of this, and though they did not quite understand what actually takes place in nature, used the simile, "as the worm becomes the wasp" (losing its own nature and taking on that of its slayer), as an exemplum of deification, of what takes place when the liberated self *devo bhūtvā devān apyeti* (BU iv.1.2); this *θέωσις* implying, in the words of Nicolas of Cusa, an *ablatio omnis alteritatis et diversitatis*.

⁸⁵ Skr. *mrg* and Gk. ἰχνεύω are used alike in the Vedic texts and by Plato with reference to the "tracking" of the Hidden Light or the Truth.

Lat. *calcatrrix* = cockatrice is also properly the "Tracker" (if not rather "Treader"), and according to Webster "originally an ichneumon" but also a "water snake," sometimes confused with the crocodile but an enemy of crocodiles. The heraldic Cockatrice or Basilisk, a winged Griffin, with a serpent's tail, is sometimes thought of as an asp, sometimes as a bird. The Hebrew *tsefar* (Isa. 11:8, Vulgate *regulus*) seems to have been a bird, and as enemy of reptiles must be thought

crocodiles and eats their eggs, and also kills and eats snakes (as the word *ὄφιολάχνης* implies). Plutarch, *Moralia* 380f, quite rightly says that the Egyptians “revered” (*ἐτίμησαν*) the ichneumon. For as Adolf Erman tells us, in an account of the divine animals of Egypt, “amongst these is the ichneumon rat into which Atum (the Sun god) changed himself when fighting against Apophis” (*Die Religion der Ägypter*, Berlin and Leipzig, 1934, p. 46), i.e., Apophis-Seth, the Egyptian Serpent or Dragon god, the constant enemy of the Sun, in a word the “Egyptian Vṛtra.” Thus Daressy, discussing an inscription on the statue of the Pharaoh “Zedher le Sauveur” (4th century B.C.), reads “Iusāāt, the eye of Rā, became an animal of 46 cubits in order to combat Āpap in his fury . . .,” the text proceeding to say that he may be invoked in cases of snake poisoning (*Annales du Service des Antiquités de l’Égypte*, XVIII, 116, 117). Sethe takes up the matter again in “Atum als Ichneumon” in *Ägyptische Sprache und Altertumskunde*, LXIII (1928), 50: “Re’ changed himself into a ‘d animal of 46 ells, to slay the serpent Apophis as he raged.” He further cites and illustrates a sculptured representation of the Egyptian mongoose, bearing the inscription “Atum, the guardian God of Heliopolis,” and concludes that the ichneumon and the Sun god “share a common name (*nd*) because they are both victors in the dangerous battle with the snake.” A more detailed account of “Das Ichneumon in der ägyptischen Religion und Kunst” is given by Günther Roeder in *Egyptian Religion*, IV (1936): in several statuettes of the erect type, the Sun and Uraeus are represented on the ichneumon’s head.

Can we assume that the Indian mongoose (*nakula*) had also been a symbol and type of the solar Indra as Ahihan? We have no direct evidence for this, beyond the implications of AV vi.139.5 already cited. But there is rather cogent indirect evidence in the fact that the female mongoose (*nakulī*), equated with the tongue, was certainly a type of the feminine principle in the cosmos, namely, Vāc (Sarasvatī, Earth, etc.). In RV i.126.6, Svanaya (whom Indra has aided, probably the Sun) says that “She who is clasped and clipt, who like the she-mongoose (*kaśikā*, Sāyaṇa *nakulī*) conceals herself (*jangahe*), she moistened gives me the

of as a Sunbird, perhaps a vulture, which actually tramples on its ophidian prey. The heraldic Cockatrice, with its combination of avian and ophidian characters, should be a type of the Supreme Identity of the two contrasted principles, divine and titanic, which can only be characterized as “good and evil” when they are in opposition, i.e., in the world with its “pairs of opposites,” which opposites are, properly speaking contraries rather than contradictories.

hundred joys of rutting”; she, who in her reply calls herself Romaśā (hairy) and says that she is fleeced like a Gandharan ewe, is, according to Sāyaṇa, “Brhaspati’s daughter.” She must be, in fact, the “tongue” (*juhu*, i.e., Vāc), Brhaspati’s wife in RV x.109.5 and the she-mongoose of AĀ iii.2.5, “the mistress of all speech, shut in by the two lips, enclosed by the teeth (*oṣṭā apinaddhā nakulī dantaiḥ parivṛtā sarvasyai vāca īśā-nā*),” *apinaddhā* and *parivṛtā* corresponding to *āgadhitā* and *parigadhitā* in i.126.6 and explaining *jangahe* (middle intensive from √ *gah*, “sich verstecken”).⁸⁶ The point of all this is that *nakulī* being Vāc, etc., her masculine counterpart must have been thought of as *nakula*, the male mongoose, and may have been so spoken of in some lost text (as in the case of other pairs with corresponding names, such as Sūrya, Sūryā; Vāśa, Vāśī; Rukma, Rukmā; Mahiṣa, Mahiṣī, etc.). The “mongoose” (m.) would thus have been a type (*rūpa*) of Indrābrhaspati or of either Brhaspati or Indra as “snake-fighter.” Brhaspati and Indra are preeminently sacrificers. And what is the essential in the Sacrifice? In the first place, to divide, and in the second to reunite. He being One, becomes or is made into Many, and being Many becomes again or is put together again as One. The breaking of bread is a division of Christ’s body made in order that we may be “all builded together in him.” God is One as He is in Himself, but Many as He is in His children (ŚB x.5.2.16). Prajāpati’s “joints are unstrung” by the emanation of his children, and “he, whose joints were unstrung, could not put them together again (*sa visrastaiḥ parvabhiḥ na śaśāka saṃhātum*, ŚB i.6.3.36 = *prajāḥ . . . tābhyah punaḥ sambhavitum nāśakṇoti*, TS v.5.2.1);⁸⁷ the final purpose of the Sacrifice is to put him together again and it is this that is done in the Sacrifice by himself (*sa chandobhir ātmānam samadadhāt*,⁸⁸ AĀ iii.2.6, etc.) or by the gods or any sacrificer, who reintegrate themselves with him at one and the same time (ŚB *passim*). Prajāpati is, of course, the Year (*samvatsara*, *passim*); as such, his partition is the distinction of times from the principle of Time; his “joints (*parvāni*)” are the junc-

⁸⁶ Other interpretations of *jangahe* are possible and even plausible. Our purpose has been to show that *nakulī* is, in fact, a type of the feminine half of the divine syzygy, *nakula* by implication a type of the male half. If *nakula* can be equated with Indra as Ahihan, as is intrinsically plausible, this would also serve to explain Kubera’s *nakula* as his purse, the inexhaustible source of his wealth, Indra being always the great dispenser.

⁸⁷ Having fettered himself by himself, like a bird in the net, MU ii.2, vi.30.

⁸⁸ Becoming thus again *samāhita*, “in *samādhi*,” converse of *hita*, *prahita*, *prativihita*, *nihita*, etc.

tions of day and night, of the two halves of the month, and of the seasons (e.g., Winter and Spring, see Appendix 2 for the "united ends of the endless Year"), ŚB 1.6.3.35, 36. In the same way Ahi-Vṛtra, whom Indra cuts up into "joints (*parvāṇi*, RV 1.19.3, VIII.6.13, VIII.7.23, etc.)" was originally "jointless" or "inarticulate"⁸⁹ (*aparvāḥ*, RV 1.19.3), i.e., "endless (*anantaḥ*). In the same way, Indra divides Magha-Vala (RV III.34.10, TB II.6.13.1), i.e., Makha (the Sacrifice, PB VII.5.6, and *saumya*, cf. RV IX.20.7 *maḥho na . . . soma*) "whom so long as he was One the Many could not overcome" (TA V.1.3).

We have already seen that the Indian texts interpret the slaying of Ahi-Vṛtra metaphysically and identify Vṛtra with the aesthetic, passible, emotional "elemental self" that is seated in the "bowels." I cannot cite Egyptian texts to the same effect, but there can be no doubt that for the Egyptians the conflict of the Sun with Apophis-Seth was one of light against darkness, good against evil. For the Hebrews, the Serpent who persuaded the mother of all mankind to eat of the fruit of the tree is certainly the type of evil and the enemy above all others; while "the word [*nefes* = *anima*] translated 'soul' so often in our English version meant . . . for all Hebrews, the lower, physical nature, the appetites, the psyche of Paul. It was used also to express 'self,' but always with that lower meaning behind it" (D. B. Macdonald, *The Hebrew Philosophical Genius*, Princeton, 1934, p. 139, cf. p. 99).⁹⁰ The serpent is explicitly this "soul" for Philo and Plutarch. Philo says that "the snake-fighter (ὄφιομάχης) is, I think, nothing but a symbolic representation of self-control (ἐγκράτεια), waging a fight that never ends and a truceless war against incontinence and pleasure. . . . For if serpentlike pleasure is a thing un-nourishing and injurious, sanity, the nature that is at war with pleasure,

⁸⁹ "Inarticulate," here "continuous," "undivided"; but also just as in another sense the silent (*aśabda*) Brahma is inarticulate (*anirukṭa*, etc.), and the expressive (*śabda*) Brahma articulate (*nirukṭa*, etc.).

⁹⁰ It is one of the chief defects of this interesting book that the author speaks of "Plato's *psyche*" as if this had been one single and altogether divine principle (pp. 99, 139). Plato, in fact, always speaks of two souls, appetitive and rational, the former corresponding to Hebrew *nefes* and St. Paul's *psyche*, and the latter to Hebrew *ruah* and St. Paul's *pneuma* (as also to the Indian *śarīra* and *aśarīra ātman*, *bhūtātman* and *antaḥ puruṣa*). Macdonald does not see that inasmuch as the Hebrew could "speak with himself and reason with himself" (p. 139), this involves two "selves," as was demonstrated once for all by Plato (*Republic* 430^{EF}, 436^B, 604^B, etc.), these two being *nefes* and *ruah*. The latter, which comes from God and is reabsorbed in him (of which Ecclesiastes "is heartily glad, for it means a final escape for man" [p. 128], i.e., if he knows *who* he is and in *which* self he will be departing at death) is the "one and only Samsārin" of the Vedānta.

must be most nutritious and a saving power. . . . Therefore set up mind (γνώμη), the snake-fighter, against it, and contend to the last in this noblest contest" (*Legum allegoriae* 1.39, 85, 86); and Plutarch that "Typhon (Seth) is that part of the soul which is passible and titanic (παθητικὸν καὶ τιτανικόν) irrational (ἄλογον) and forward, and of the bodily part the perishable, diseased and disordered, as is shown in abnormal seasons and temperatures, and by eclipses of the sun and disappearances of the moon, eruptions as it were and lawless acts on the part of Typhon . . . whose name signifies 'restraint' or 'hindrance'" (*Moralia* 371 B.C.).⁹¹ In Christianity, the "Serpent" is still the "Tempter."

The Indians *may* have thought that the mongoose not only bit to pieces the snake but also put it together again, somewhat as the weasel of folklore is supposed to revive its dead mate by means of a life-giving herb. It may be, and probably is, with an "herb of virility" that the mongoose of AV 139.6 puts the "snake" together again and so "heals (*bheṣajati*)" it as they "heal" the divided Year in ŚB 1.6.3.35, 36; and we can even say that the Ahi identified with the "soul" (the "double-tongued" Aditi-Vāc of ŚB III.2.4.16) is the "mate" of the Nakula identified with the divine Eros who, assuredly, "puts together again whatever of love is divided." But bearing in mind that supernatural no more means unnatural than superessential means nonessential, we say that it is not as natural history but as myth that the acts of the mongoose are to be understood. The *nakula-ōphiomáχης* is a type or exemplum of the divine or human sacrificer; the snake "a symbol of magic healing."⁹²

⁹¹ "Self-government" (*svarāj*), i.e., "inward government of the worse by the naturally better part" of us (Plato, *Republic* 431^{AB}, etc.).

⁹² Cf. Grimm, *Märchen*, 16, "Die drei Schlangenblätter," and the snake that Asclepius was, which later survives coiled about his staff.